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Abstract
This thesis examines whether the Tanzanian subsidy for inorganic fertilizer and improved maize
seed since 2008 (NAIVS) promoted farmers to participate in both agricultural input and grain
markets. The dataset comes from two waves of the National Panel Survey, which covers the whole
area of Tanzania. Using Correlated Random Effects Tobit and Probit models, I first investigate
whether the subsidy affected farmers’ expenditure on all types of agricultural inputs including
non-subsidized ones (organic fertilizer, traditional seed, pesticide/herbicide, labor, capital). Then,
I estimate the subsidy impacts on the probability for farmers to sell maize and their maize sales. I
find the average beneficiary at least tripled the expenditure on subsidized inputs, without changing
expenditure on non-subsidized inputs significantly. Conversely, the probability for beneficiaries to
sell maize and their maize sales did not increase significantly. Finally, I address the concern that
excessive concentration on subsidized inputs distorted appropriate allocation of production factors.
Using a Stochastic Frontier model, I test whether the subsidy affected the efficiency of farmers’
maize production. Consequently, the subsidy did not deteriorate the production efficiency. These
results show the subsidy promoted farmers’ participation in input markets without sacrificing
the consumption of non-subsidized inputs and production efficiency. These results question the
subsidy’s sustainability because it did not promote farmers’ maize-selling activities, a main income
source for Tanzanian smallholders to purchase agricultural inputs.
Key Words
Input subsidy; Fertilizer subsidy; Market participation; Production efficiency; Tanzania; Sub-Saharan
Africa
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1 Introduction
Realizing the African Green Revolution has been a critical issue to achieve high agricultural production
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Of the world fertilizer consumption in 2013, the SSA region just accounts
for less than two percent in nitrogen, phosphate, and potash (FAO 2015). Some SSA governments and
development partners have endeavored to raise the smallholders’ use of modern agricultural inputs such
as fertilizer and improved seed. One practice is a large-scale input subsidy program for smallholders,
which was introduced in some SSA countries such as Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia in
East Africa and Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali, Nigeria, Ghana in West Africa (Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurl
2012).
By comprehensively analyzing farmers’ activities, this thesis provides new insights to previous
literature that has focused on specific aspects of subsidy impacts. A representative topic of previous
literature is on revealing whether a subsidy enables farmers to adopt subsidized inputs and achieve high
agricultural production (Chibwana et al. 2010; Aloyce et al. 2014; World Bank 2014; Ricker-Gilbert
and Jayne 2017). Another representative topic is whether a subsidy crowds out farmers’ commercial
purchases of subsidized inputs (Xu et al. 2009; Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2011; Mason et al. 2013; Liverpool-
tasie 2012). However, the analyses of these previous works are insufficient to evaluate the efficiency
and sustainability of SSA subsidies. The overuse of subsidized inputs may decrease the consumption of
non-subsidized inputs and deteriorate agricultural productivity, which may ruin the fruits of subsidies.
In particular, selling activities of subsidized farmers has not been examined in previous works, despite
its obvious importance for farmers’ sustainable development. Therefore, this thesis aims to evaluate
the effectiveness and sustainability of SSA subsidies in broader perspectives.
This thesis deals with the subsidy program for inorganic fertilizer and improved seed in Tanzania
since 2008, or the National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS). This program aims to pro-
mote small-scale farmers to adopt modern agricultural technologies by providing them with a voucher.
Subsidized farmers who receive a voucher purchase inorganic fertilizer and improved seed at half the
price at a local retail shop.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the NAIVS program strengthened farmers activities
in both agricultural input and grain markets. The dataset comes from two waves of the Tanzanian
National Panel Survey, which collects socioeconomic and agronomic information at household and
plot levels nationwide in Tanzania. I first evaluate the subsidy impacts on farmers’ participation in
agricultural input markets by examining their expenditure on all types of agricultural inputs such
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as inorganic fertilizer, improved seed, organic fertilizer, traditional seed, pesticide/herbicide, labor,
capital. Estimating the increase of expenditure on subsidized inputs (inorganic fertilizer and improved
seed) is insufficient to evaluate farmers’ market participation. Subsidized farmers may sacrifice the
consumption of non-subsidized inputs by excessively investing in half-price subsidized inputs, which
offsets farmers’ participation in agricultural input markets as a whole. To evaluate the subsidy impacts
on farmers’ participation in grain markets, on the other hand, I examine the probability for farmers to
sell maize and their maize sales. Maize is the most popular staple food in Tanzania and its improved seed
is a main subsidized input in the NAIVS program. For the estimations above, I adopt the Correlated
Random Effects Tobit and Probit models. This method enables us to address the potential endogeneity
of subsidy programs by controlling for farmers’ time-constant heterogeneity.
Though I attempt to evaluate the NAIVS program by using a comprehensive set of inputs, we still
have the following question: does the overuse of cheap subsidized inputs lower agricultural productivity?
Subsidized farmers may use subsidized inputs beyond the appropriate application level relative to non-
subsidized inputs. To answer this question, I finally use a Stochastic Frontier (SF) model to test
whether the NAIVS program affected the efficiency of farmers’ maize production. The SF model offers
an econometric method to directly measure production inefficiency. This approach also measures the
response of harvested maize to production factors, which is beneficial to investigate whether the subsidy
is effective to raise farmers’ agricultural production.
To summarize, this thesis empirically answers the following three questions:
(1) Did the subsidy promote or sacrifice beneficiaries’ consumption of non-subsidized inputs?
(2) Did the subsidy raise the probability for beneficiaries to sell maize and their maize sales?
(3) Did the subsidy deteriorate beneficiaries’ technical efficiency of maize production?
In Questions (1) and (2), the thesis aims to capture farmers’ behaviors in agricultural markets. Hence,
farmers’ consumption of inputs and their grain-selling activities are examined at household level. In
Question (3), on the other hand, the thesis aims to evaluate farmers’ agricultural productivity, which
varies with soil quality of each cultivated plot. Therefore, Question (3) is strictly tested at plot level.
Though these questions are investigated at different levels of estimation units, the three questions
are closely connected with each other. Estimated results for one question is beneficial to interpret
estimated results for another question.
This thesis will be beneficial in designing an efficient subsidy program. Obviously, activating farm-
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ers’ participation in agricultural markets is inevitable for sustainable development of agricultural pro-
duction. Selling activities in grain markets enable farmers to independently use agricultural inputs
after the subsidy graduation and to raise their production level in the long run. To achieve the higher
level of production for sales, we must confirm the subsidy increases the use of subsidized inputs with-
out sacrificing demands for non-subsidized inputs. We also must confirm subsidized farmers produce
outputs without alleviating production efficiency by excessive use of subsidized inputs.
The results in the thesis show that the average beneficiary farmer at least tripled the expenditure on
inorganic fertilizer and improved seed. This considerably increased expenditure can be explained by the
increased probability for beneficiaries to purchase subsidized inputs. Despite the large increase above,
the expenditure on non-subsidized inputs is not significantly increased nor decreased. Furthermore,
I do not find evidence that the NAIVS program affected the production efficiency of beneficiaries.
Therefore, the NAIVS program promoted farmers’ participation in agricultural input markets as a
whole, with production efficiency maintained. Nevertheless, neither the probability of selling maize nor
the amount of maize sales increased significantly for beneficiaries. Hence, the subsidy program did not
strengthen farmers’ activities in maize markets. This insignificant result is attributed to the endogenous
process of selecting subsidized farmers. The NAIVS may have selected farmers who were selling crops
to markets to ensure these farmers could afford half the payments of subsidized inputs. In addition,
SF results reveal that using subsidized inputs contributes to significant but small increases in maize
production. These findings indicate the lack of sustainability of the NAIVS program because maize
selling activities are a main income source for most smallholders to purchase agricultural inputs. This
pessimistic finding cannot be obtained by previous works that focused on specific aspects of subsidies.
The rest of this thesis proceeds as follows. I first describe the Tanzanian agricultural sector, the
NAIVS program, and previous literature in Section 2. Then, I discuss conceptual framework in Sec-
tion 3. In Section 4, dataset and estimation methodology is explained. I present results and robustness
checks in Section 5. In Section 6, I estimate farmers’ technical efficiency using a SF model. Finally,
conclusions and policy implications are discussed in Section 7.
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2 Background information
2.1 Agricultural Sector in Tanzania
The Tanzanian economy is characterized by the importance of agricultural sector. In Tanzania, agricul-
ture, forestry, and fishing accounts for about 30 percent of the whole GDP in 2017. Around 66 percent of
the total employment is engaged in agricultural production in 2018. In particular, smallholder farmers
make up more than 80 percent of the total farm-land holdings in 2013.1
Tanzania’s agricultural zones are divided into three categories ecologically by IFDC (2012). The
first zone is a coastal zone with the low altitude below 750 meters above sea level. Soil fertility is
variable and annual rainfall is between 750 and 1,200 mm. Figure 1 in Supplementary Appendix
presents the map of Tanzania divided by regions. Then, the coastal zone includes regions of Dar es
Salaam, Lindi, Mtwara, Morogoro, Tanga, and Zanzibar. The second zone is a semi-arid zone with
the medium altitude of 500-1,800 meters above sea level. This zone is located in the drier central
and northern areas with low and unreliable rainfall and relatively infertile soils. The semi-arid zone
includes regions of Dodoma, Singida, and Tabora. The third zone is a highland zone that is located in
northeastern, southern, southwestern and western highlands with high altitudes of 1,200-2,300 meters
above sea level. Soil fertility is low to moderate with reliable annual rainfall of 800-1,400 mm. The
highland zone includes regions of Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Mbeya, Rukwa, Iringa, and Ruvuma.
There are two rainy seasons in Tanzania: the long rainy season (masika) from roughly March to
May and the short rainy season (vuli) from October to December. Crops are cultivated intensively
in these rainy seasons, though some areas have only the long rainy season. Rainfall is bimodal in the
northern coastal zone and the western highland zone, and is unimodal in the southern coastal zone
and the semi-arid zone (IFDC 2012).
Maize is the most popular food crop cultivated by Tanzanian smallholder farmers. Figure 2 shows
the distribution of harvested areas for the largest ten primary crops in 2015.2 Harvested areas for
maize is overwhelmingly large, 3,787,751 hectares, followed by 1,787,888 hectares for sunflower seed
and 1,624,683 hectares for groundnuts, representative cash and export crops in Tanzania. Other priority
food crops in Tanzania are paddy rice and cassava, whose harvested areas are 1,154,467 hectares and
1For the proportion of agricultural GDP, take a look at FAOSTAT (http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/MK/
visualize). The percentage of agricultural workers in Tanzania can be seen in World Bank database (https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?end=2018&locations=TZ&start=1991&view=chart). FAO Smallholders Dat-
aportrait put statistics of smallholder farmers on its website (http://www.fao.org/family-farming/data-sources/
dataportrait/country-details/en/?cnt=TZA). For the definition of smallholder farmers, see (FAO 2017).
2I refer to CountrySTAT in FAO, a web-based information system for food and agriculture statistics at regional,
national and subnational levels (http://countrystat.org/home.aspx?c=TZA&p=ke).
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1,094,900 hectares, respectively. Figure 3 presents the distribution of production quantity for the
largest ten crops in 2015. Produced tons of maize is 5,902,776, followed by 5,886,440 tons of cassava.
Produced tons of paddy rice is 2,979,860. The production of major food crops showed a five percent
annual growth in a decade from 2000 (IFDC 2012). This production growth is mainly caused by the
increase in harvested area. Figure 4 reveals harvested areas for cereals roughly doubled from 2,514,775
hectares in 2000 to 5,244,863 hectares in 2010.3 Traditional cash crops such as cashew, coffee, cotton,
pyrethrum, sugar, tea and tobacco are steadily growing in production, exhibiting seven percent annual
growth on average from 2000 to 2010. Around 13 percent of the total planted areas are devoted to
these cash crops in 2010 (IFDC 2012).
The smallholder-based economy of Tanzania features low adoption rates of agricultural inputs. The
Tanzania National Panel Survey (NPS), a nationally representative household survey in Tanzania,
reports 15.9 percent of households use inorganic fertilizers in crop production in the 2014/15 census
(National Bureau of Statistics 2017). The percentage of households using improved seeds is relatively
high (44.0 percent). The proportion of households using pesticides/insecticides is only 5.0 percent.
Their land cultivation highly depends on hand-hoe use: the proportion of households using hand hoes
is 97.9 percent, whereas those using animal traction and tractors are around 33 percent and 8.9 percent,
respectively. These poor usages of farming technologies limit the agricultural performance in Tanzania.
The agricultural grain and input markets are basically liberalized in Tanzania. The Tanzanian
government abolished monopolies and opened these markets to private sectors in 1990s under the
structural-adjustment program. Since then, the private sector has traded agricultural commodities
competitively in the grain market where regional tax rates were reduced and direct taxes on grain
exports were eliminated (Morrissey and Leyaro 2007; World Bank 2012). In the fertilizer market, most
of the inorganic fertilizers are imported. There are around ten importers and wholesalers, and 3,000
retailers are estimated to engage in dealing in fertilizer (Benson et al. 2012; Cameron et al. 2017). The
private sector in the seed market supplied about 80 percent of the total commercial seed during the
2010/11 season (World Bank 2012).
2.2 National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme
The National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) is a subsidy program for inorganic fertilizer
and improved seed in Tanzania. It targets small-scale farmers who have limited experience but potential
3FAO STAT (http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#country/215)
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to use fertilizer and improved seed. The subsidy provides targeted farmers with vouchers for three
consecutive years and enables them to purchase specific types of fertilizer and seed at half the price in
registered retail shops. The program also involves the training of private agro-dealers to improve the
accessibility to subsidized inputs in local markets (Benson et al. 2012; World Bank 2014).
The NAIVS program has two characteristics as an input-subsidy program. First, it is based on the
market transaction between farmers and private agro-dealers. Targeted farmers are not automatically
offered fertilizer and seed in kind. Second, subsidy vouchers can be interpreted as declines in the prices
of subsidized inputs. Targeted farmers have to afford half the input cost even if they redeem vouchers
at retail shops.
The NAIVS program was conducted in eleven agriculturally high potential regions in 2008/09 after
the experimental implementation in two districts in 2007/08. Then, targeted regions were expanded
nationwide by 2011/12 (World Bank 2014). In 2008/09, the number of beneficiaries of this program is
730,667 and dramatically increased to more than two million in 2010/11. Then, it declined to 940,783
in 2012/13 along with the three-year graduation of beneficiaries from the program (World Bank 2014).
Targeted farmers receive three types of vouchers: one type for seed and two types for inorganic
fertilizer. In the first type, maize-growing farmers are offered vouchers for 10 kg of either an improved
open pollinated maize variety or a hybrid maize.4 Rice-growing farmers, on the other hand, are offered
vouchers for 15 kg of paddy seed. Nearly 80 percent of the seed vouchers were allocated to maize
farmers; the remaining 20 percent to rice farmers. The second voucher is for one 50 kg bag of urea, a
nitrogenous fertilizer for top dressing (World Bank 2009; World Bank 2014). The third voucher is for one
50 kg bag of diammonium phosphate (DAP), or two 50 kg bags of Minjingu Rock Phosphate (MRP),
phosphorous fertilizers with nitrogen supplements for basal dressing.5 Subsidizing superphosphate or
ammonium sulphate instead is also possible in a few areas. In reality, beneficiaries do not always receive
or redeem all the three vouchers above. World Bank (2014) surveyed voucher recipients in the 2010/11
season and found 13 percent of the recipients redeemed one voucher, whereas 15 percent redeemed two
vouchers.
Farmers who receive a voucher are expected to meet some criteria (World Bank 2014). They have
to be full-time farmers with less than one hectare of cultivated land. They also have to co-finance half
of the input payment that is not covered by vouchers. Following the advice of extension workers is
required too. Desirable farmers are those with little or no experience to purchase agricultural inputs
4District extension officers determine a voucher type of maize seed at village level in advance.
5The MRP was later replaced by Minjing Mazao, an MRP blend with urea (Benson et al. 2012; World Bank 2014).
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during the previous five years. Female-headed households are also desirable. Within these guidelines,
farmers are selected by the Village Voucher Committee (VVC), which is formed by the Village Council
in consultation with the Village Assembly.
Despite the program design aforementioned, there is a danger of “local elite capture” in the selection
of subsidized farmers. Using a panel data of households in Kilimanjaro Region, Pan and Christiaensen
(2012) showed VVC members and elected village officials, and farmers who were connected with them,
received a voucher in significantly high probability. In contrast, World Bank (2014) claims elite capture
was successfully reduced by the program training and supervisory support strengthened by the World
Bank in 2009, and that there was little sign of elite capture afterwards. In either case, farmers’ un-
observed characteristics are likely to affect the eligibility for vouchers. Therefore, the farmer-selecting
process in the program is an econometric concern to be treated in this thesis.
2.3 Literature Review
In previous works, SSA subsidies for agricultural inputs are evaluated broadly in two directions. The
first direction focuses on revealing whether a subsidy truly achieves its original purpose. For instance,
Chibwana et al. (2010) found the Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) significantly in-
creased the intensity of fertilizer among beneficiary households. World Bank (2014) showed 37 percent
and 57 percent of beneficiary farmers in the NAIVS continued to purchase fertilizer and improved
seed after the program graduation, respectively. Aloyce et al. (2014) indicated the positive impact of
the NAIVS program on agricultural productivity of beneficiary households. Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne
(2017) revealed the long-run effects of the Malawi’s FISP on maize production was limited. These
previous works evaluate a subsidy by examining the adoption of subsidized inputs and the increase of
agricultural production.
The second direction puts emphasis on analyzing how a subsidy program influences its surrounding
sectors and associated markets. A representative issue in this direction is whether a subsidy crowds
out farmers’ commercial purchases of subsidized inputs. Xu et al. (2009) found the Zambia’s fertilizer
subsidy substantially crowded out the private sector in relatively active areas with private retailers,
though crowding-in effects were conversely found in areas with the relatively inactive private sector.
Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2011) showed the Malawi’s FISP crowded out 0.22 kg of commercial fertilizer per
additional kilogram of subsidized fertilizer. Liverpool-tasie (2012) found the Nigeria’s subsidy increased
the purchased quantity of fertilizer in the private market by linking farmers to input supplier once the
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market participation was determined by farmers. Mason et al. (2013) extended Xu et al. (2009) and
Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2011) by considering the leakage of subsidized fertilizer diverted and resold
through commercial channels, and revealed one additional kilogram of subsidized fertilizer increased
the total fertilizer use by 0.54 kg in the Zambia’s subsidy. These previous works targeted purchasing
behaviors of subsidized farmers in surrounding fertilizer markets.
There are two limitations in the analysis of previous literature. First, most previous works have
limited their issues to farmers’ behavioral changes concerning subsidized inputs. Agricultural inputs
should be effectively combined with each other to achieve efficient production. The cheap price of
subsidized inputs, on the other hand, may encourage farmers to sacrifice the consumption of non-
subsidized inputs and overuse subsidized inputs, which deteriorates farmers’ efficient production. Most
previous works have ignored farmers’ behavioral changes concerning non-subsidized inputs, despite
the importance of complementary use of inputs in modern agriculture. Second, previous works have
not examined selling activities of subsidized farmers in grain markets. For further investments in
agricultural inputs, farmers must sell crops to markets to obtain cash income. Hence, examining the
increase of agricultural production is insufficient; we also must examine whether a subsidy promotes
farmers to sell crops in grain markets.
This thesis is characterized by the comprehensive analysis of farmers’ activities in subsidies. I first
estimate subsidy impacts on farmers’ expenditures in a comprehensive set of production factors, such
as inorganic fertilizer, improved seed, organic fertilizer, traditional seed, pesticide/herbicide, labor,
and capital. Then, this thesis examines whether a subsidy increases the probability for farmers to sell
maize and the amount of maize sales. Finally, this thesis tests whether the NAIVS affected farmers’
production efficiency because farmers may use cheap subsidized inputs beyond efficient application
levels.
Some previous works have already investigated how a subsidy changes farmers’ demands or supplies
for non-subsidized inputs. Holden and Lunduka (2012) revealed the intensity of fertilizer use was
positively correlated with the probability and intensity of manure use in the Malawi’s FISP. Ricker-
Gilbert (2014) found the Malawi’s FISP reduced farmer’s labor supply in local labor markets and
slightly increased the probability for farmers to demand labor. In this sense, this thesis extends Holden
and Lunduka (2012) and Ricker-Gilbert (2014) above to the broader framework.
Some previous works used cost-benefit analyses to evaluate the subsidy performance by estimating
a ratio between farmers’ output returns and program’s cost (Dorward and Chirwa 2011; Lunduka et
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al. 2013; World Bank 2014). These works are concerned with the program cost-effectiveness. On the
other hand, my interest is in farmers’ production efficiency. No previous works have paid attention to
the possibility that the excessive use of subsidized inputs distorts the distribution ratio of production
factors and deteriorates farmers’ production efficiency. Input-subsidy programs must be evaluated in
this perspective as well.
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3 Conceptual Framework
This section discusses an economic framework to describe how the Tanzanian subsidy would change
purchased amounts of each agricultural input and grain sales. To illustrate the economic framework in
an input-subsidy program, I rely on Agricultural Household (HH) model.
The HH model focuses on the fact that rural farmers in developing countries consume agricultural
outputs produced by themselves (Taylor and Adelman 2003). Producers and consumers are not sepa-
rated in the HH model. I assume a representative farmer maximizes its utility u = u(Ca, Cb, Cl), where
Ca and Cb are the consumptions of agricultural product a and non-agricultural goods b, respectively,
and Cl is the consumption of leisure with the constraint 0 ≤ Cl ≤ T (T > 0). Let pa and pb be the
prices of goods a and b. On the other hand, I assume the farmer gains profits by producing agricul-
tural products y = f(xs, xn, xl), where I denote a farmer’s production function by f(xs, xn, xl) with
subsidized input xs, non-subsidized input xn, and labor xl. Let ws, wn, wl > 0 be corresponding input
prices. I denote family labor by Lf and hired labor by Lh. Then, Cl +Lf = T and xl = Lf +Lh hold.
The representative farmer maximizes its utility u = u(Ca, Cb, Cl) on the constraint of profits gained
in production, that is,
max
Ca,Cb,Cl,xs,xn,xl
u(Ca, Cb, Cl) s.t. paCa + pbCb = paf(xs, xn, xl)− wsxs − wnxn − wlLh.
Because Cl + Lf = T and xl = Lf + Lh hold, the constraint above can be replaced by
paCa + pbCb + wlCl = paf(xs, xn, xl)− wsxs − wnxn − wlxl + wlT.
Solving this maximization problem, we get demand functions for consumption goods,
C∗a = Ca(pa, pb, ws, wn, wl), C
∗
b = Cb(pa, pb, ws, wn, wl), C
∗
l = Cl(pa, pb, ws, wn, wl),
and demand functions for production factors,
x∗s = xs(pa, ws, wn, wl), x
∗
n = xn(pa, ws, wn, wl), x
∗
l = xl(pa, ws, wn, wl).
In the settings above, demand functions for production factors are first obtained by the standard profit
maximization. Then, demand functions for consumption goods are determined to maximize the utility.
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In the subsidy program, the farmer faces the decrease in the price of subsidized input n. Then, my
interest is to clarify the sign of
∂x∗n
∂ws
in input markets.6 To discuss the sign, complementary aspects of
agricultural production must be considered.
Modern agricultural inputs functionally complement each other in agricultural production. For ex-
ample, improved or hybrid seed can yield more agricultural products by combining it with inorganic
fertilizer (Recall the Asian Green Evolution: newly introduced semi-dwarf rice varieties can absorb
more nitrogen than traditional ones). Using inorganic fertilizer causes the emergence of pests and
weed, so that pesticide and herbicide should be sprayed in fertilized land. Organic manure develops
soil structures and keeps in soil the nutrients of inorganic fertilizer so that plants can absorb them ef-
fectively. Fertilizing and spraying pesticide/herbicide requires additional labor and capital (a sprayer).7
If agricultural inputs s and n are complementary, we have
∂x∗n
∂ws
< 0. This implies the decrease in the
price of subsidized input s leads to the larger demand for non-subsidized input n.8
Despite agronomic synergies among agricultural inputs, African farmers may not purchase agricul-
tural inputs in a complementary way because of their cash and credit constraints. Using comparable
datasets of six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Sheahan and Barrett (2017) revealed there is low cor-
relation in the use of complementary agricultural inputs at household and plot levels. Hence, we may
observe no change in the consumption of non-subsidized inputs in reality. It is also possible farmers
overuse cheap subsidized inputs by saving the purchase of non-subsidized inputs, which leads to the
decrease in the consumption of non-subsidized inputs.
The labor demand is more complicated than other input demands. The demand function for family
labor is determined by L∗f = T −C∗l . Then, we get the demand function for hired labor, L∗h = x∗l −L∗f .
Because labor is divided in separate terms as x∗l = L
∗
f + L
∗
h,
∂L∗f
∂ws
may have the opposite sign of
∂L∗h
∂ws
.
Even if subsidized inputs and labor are complementary in production and
∂x∗l
∂ws
< 0 holds, either
∂L∗f
∂ws
6Precisely, the subsidized amounts in NAIVS are determined in advance: a 50 kg bag for specific inorganic fertilizer
and a 10 kg bag for maize seed. In reality, beneficiary farmers consume a packaged type of inputs. In the conceptual
framework here, I simplify the subsidy settings so that beneficiary farmers can purchase subsidized inputs continuously
without the ceiling.
7One exception is between labor and capital. Tractors, for example, can be substituted for manpower. Another
exception is between traditional seed and improved seed. Improved seed is preferred to traditional seed in modern
agricultural production. Hence, farmers purchase more improved seed than traditional seed if the former price decreases
sufficiently.
8For example, this complementary relation between inputs s and n can be represented by combining a Leontief
production function with a Cobb-Douglas production function, that is, f(xs, xn, xl) = (min{axs, bxn})β1xβ2l with a, b >
0. I assume diminishing returns to scale, 0 < β1 +β2 < 1, to obtain the unique demand functions for production factors.
This assumption is reasonable because the farmer seems not to change the amount of its own land flexibly in the short
run when the farmer is eligible for the subsidy. Then, we have x∗n =
1
b
(
abβ1
bws+awn
) 1−β2
1−β1−β2
(
β2
wl
) β2
1−β1−β2 p
1
1−β1−β2
a ,
which implies
∂x∗n
∂ws
< 0.
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or
∂L∗h
∂ws
may be non-negative. Hence, the subsidy does not necessarily increase family labor and hired
labor simultaneously, even if subsidized inputs require additional labor in production.9
Therefore, the economic relation among agricultural inputs is not obvious in rural farmers. It is
meaningful to check how the NAIVS program changes farmers’ demands for non-subsidized inputs,
because the subsidy actually decreases prices of inorganic fertilizer and improved seed for beneficiaries.
Beneficiary farmers may excessively use cheap inorganic fertilizer and improved seed in production by
ignoring complementary combinations with other inputs. In that case, estimating subsidy impacts on
farmers’ purchase of subsidized inputs is insufficient to evaluate farmers’ participation in agricultural
input markets; we also have to estimate the impact on the purchase of non-subsidized inputs.
Using the same economic framework, this section also discusses farmer’s selling activities in grain
markets. I assume the representative farmer sells the food surplus defined by S = f(x∗s, x
∗
n, x
∗
l )− C∗a .
Then, the subsidy impact on farmer’s selling activities in a grain market is expressed as
(3.1)
∂S
∂ws
=
∂f
∂xs
∂x∗s
∂ws
+
∂f
∂xn
∂x∗n
∂ws
+
∂f
∂xl
∂x∗l
∂ws
− ∂C
∗
a
∂ws
.
Clarifying the sign of ∂S∂ws is my concern. If
∂S
∂ws
< 0 holds, the subsidy increases farmer’s grain sales. If
∂S
∂ws
> 0 holds, the subsidy decreases farmer’s grain sales by increasing its self-consumption. In the first
term of the right-hand side, ∂f∂xi ≥ 0 basically holds for i = s, n, l. We also have
∂x∗s
∂ws
≤ 0 in most cases.
However, the sign of
∂x∗n
∂ws
(and
∂x∗l
∂ws
) again depends on the relation among production factors:
∂x∗n
∂ws
< 0
holds if inputs s and n are complementary; otherwise,
∂x∗n
∂ws
≥ 0 holds. Hence, if the complementary
relations among inputs are dominant in farmer’s agricultural production, the first term is negative. The
sign of
∂C∗a
∂ws
is unclear.10 Thus, farmer’s grain selling is activated by the subsidy if subsidized inputs
and non-subsidized ones are complementary and outputs rise sufficiently by the increase of production
factors. If output responses to production factors are small and production factors are low-correlated
or substitutable, on the other hand, the subsidy does not promote farmer’s selling activities in grain
markets.11
9Let u(Ca, Cb, Cl) = C
α1
a C
α2
b C
α3
l with α1 + α2 + α3 = 1. I adopt the same production function as the previous
footnote. Then, we have C∗l =
α3(1−β1−β2)
wl
(
pa
(
abβ1
bws+awn
)β1 ( β2
wl
)β2) 11−β1−β2
+α3T , which implies
∂C∗l
∂ws
< 0. Because
L∗f = T − C∗l , we have
∂L∗f
∂ws
> 0. Conversely, we have
∂L∗h
∂ws
< 0 because L∗h = x
∗
l − L∗f and
∂x∗l
∂ws
< 0.
10Let π = paf(x∗s , x
∗
n, x
∗
l )− wsx∗s − wnx∗n − wlx∗l . Then, the ambiguity of
∂C∗a
∂ws
is attributed to that of ∂π
∂ws
.
11This thesis provides a considerably simplified version of HH model to emphasize the importance of input relations
in agricultural production. The economic framework here assumes the perfect neoclassical markets and ignores the
possibility of missing markets (De Janvry et al. 1991; Taylor and Adelman 2003). Empirically, smallholder’s market
participation is prevented by such barriers as transaction costs, credit constraints, and weak marketing infrastructure
(Barrett 2008).
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4 Dataset and Estimation Strategy
4.1 Dataset
The dataset comes from the Tanzanian National Panel Survey (NPS) in the World Bank’s Living Stan-
dards Measurement Study-Integrated Survey on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA). The survey is conducted
every two years from 2008/09 to 2014/15 by the Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in
cooperation with the World Bank and other development organizations. It extracts nationally repre-
sentative samples nationwide and collects agricultural and socioeconomic information of households
and their agricultural plots through questionnaires.
This thesis uses two waves of 2010/11 and 2012/13 in the panel survey. The first wave (2008/09)
is not used because it does not contain information on whether a household received a voucher. The
fourth wave (2014/15) is not used either, because the NPS refreshed sampled households at this wave
to address attrition bias over time (NBS 2016). Additionally, it adopts new administrative boundaries
which was not used in the previous waves. For consistency, the dataset comprises only two waves of
2010/11 and 2012/13. The total sample size of the second wave at the onset is 3,924 households; that of
the third wave is 5,015.12 The household attrition rate between the two waves is roughly 3.50 percent
(NBS 2014).
For homogeneity in the dataset, I restrict my attention to households with maize production in
the mainland of Tanzania.13 For agricultural information, this thesis focuses on farmers’ cultivation
activities in the long rainy season; agricultural information in the short rainy season are not used
in the analysis. In Tanzania, farmer’s cultivation is conducted in the two rainy seasons: the long
rainy season (masika) from roughly March to May and the short rainy season (vuli) from October
to December. Though the northern regions in Tanzania have the short rainy season, the central and
southern regions tend to have only the long rainy season (Bhargava et al. 2018). For the consistency
among regions, I define the cultivation seasons to the long rainy season. Finally, I eliminate outliers by
dropping households whose expenditure in each agricultural input and total crop sales are more than
99 percentile. Consequently, I obtain a balanced panel of 845 households in each wave.
12The sample size of the third wave outnumbers that of the second wave because new households split off from
households originally selected in the second wave and were newly added to the third wave. Some household members in
the second wave formed a new household or join another household as a new member in the third wave.
13Though the dataset is restricted to farmers with maize production, many of them cultivate multiple plots and
produce crops other than maize. Moreover, it is possible that they may invest subsidized inputs in a plot with no maize.
Hence, the maize production is just the minimum guarantee of farmers’ homogeneity.
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4.2 Estimation Strategy
This subsection explains an econometric method to estimate the subsidy impacts on farmer’s partici-
pation in both agricultural input and grain markets. As discussed in Section 2.2, voucher beneficiaries
are expected to meet some criteria, or are likely to be connected with “local elite”. Thus, unobserved
heterogeneity of households is a basic concern here. This thesis relies on Tobit and Probit models com-
bined with Correlated Random Effects (CRE) to control for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity
of households.14 The CRE method is formulated by the Chamberlain-Mundlak device (Mundlak 1978;
Chamberlain 1984). Adapting it to the Tobit model, I follow Wooldridge (2010) to estimate the subsidy
impacts on farmer i’s expenditure in each agricultural input at year t:
(4.1) yit = max(0, ψ + αvf,it + βvs,it + x
′
itγ + x
′
iξ + ai + uit),
where ai ∼ N(0, σ2a) conditional on (vf,it, vs,it,xit) and uit ∼ N(0, σ2u) conditional on (vf,it, vs,it,xit, ai)
for t = 1, 2. The dependent variable yit is expenditure on each agricultural input. The variables of my
interest are vf,it and vs,it, dummy variables for receiving a voucher of inorganic fertilizer and im-
proved seed, respectively. Household characteristics are denoted by the vector xit; xi is the vector of
time-averaged values of the two voucher dummies vf,it, vs,it and household characteristics xit. Time-
averaged values xi are constant for t = 1, 2 in household i, but are variable across households.
The CRE Tobit model controls for household’s time-constant unobserved heterogeneity by the
Chamberlain-Mundlak device of adding the time-averaged values xi to independent variables. The
traditional random effects (RE) Tobit model is given if we set ξ = 0 in equation (4.1) (Wooldridge
2010). One assumption of the RE Tobit model is the household’s heterogeneity ai is uncorrelated with
a set of independent variables. Satisfying this assumption, however, is unlikely in reality. Adding the
time-averaged values xi to the RE Tobit model allows us to assume ai is uncorrelated with independent
14Another possible approach is a Control Function (CF) method combined with correlated random effects Tobit
and Probit models. The CF approach addresses an endogenous variable in two-step procedures using instrumental
variables, which are similar to two-stage least squares (2SLS) steps (Wooldridge 2015). Whereas the CRE approach
controls for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity of households, the CF approach controls for unobserved time-
variant heterogeneity as well as time-invariant one. Applying the CF method to the CRE Probit model was theoretically
justified in Papke and Wooldridge (2008). Some papers have practically combined CF with other CRE non-linear models
to evaluate input-subsidy programs. For instance, Holden and Lunduka (2012) applied CRE Probit and Tobit models
using a CF method. A double-hurdle model, an extended version of Tobit model, was combined with CF in Ricker-
Gilbert et al. (2011) and Liverpool-tasie (2012). However, this thesis does not use CF in estimation for three reasons.
First, finding an instrumental variable is difficult. Second, the dataset in this thesis does not satisfy an assumption to
apply the CF method to a nonlinear model. The assumption requires an endogenous variable not to have discreteness
(Papke and Wooldridge 2008). This thesis uses dummy variables to represent farmers’ voucher receipts, which violates
the assumption. Finally, the CF method is only valid for only one endogenous variable. In this thesis, there are two
endogenous variables, that is, two types of vouchers for fertilizer and seed. Because the two endogenous variables are
correlated, excluding either of them in the CF approach may lead to biased results caused by omitted variables.
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variables.15
Regarding independent variables, I separate two types of voucher dummies for fertilizer and seed.
Excluding either of the two voucher dummies from the regression may lead to omitted biased problems
because of the correlation between the two voucher dummies. Inorganic fertilizer and improved seed
may affect farmers’ behaviors in different directions. Using fertilizer may encourage the consumption
of some input, whereas using improved seed may discourage it, which leads to the underestimation
of coefficients of voucher dummies. Overestimation is also possible when both vouchers encourage the
consumption of some input. Hence, I do not integrate the two voucher dummies to a single one.
I include household characteristics such as age, sex, and education years of household head. Adult
equivalents is used as a household-size indicator to correct for differences in household composition
and size. The adjustment methodology is discussed in NBS (2014).
To control for the scale of farmer’s agricultural production, I add total acres of cultivated plots
within each household, which was measured using GPS.16 I also control for subjective soil quality of
each household. To calculate it, I first assign a score to farmers’ subjective evaluation for each of their
plots (bad = 0, average = 1, good = 2). Then, the score is multiplied by the proportion of plot acres in
the total acres of all household’s plots. I sum up the multiplied scores within each household to obtain
the weighted soil quality.
I introduce a dummy for urban residence. To control for the access to markets, I add the distance
from each household to the nearest agricultural market. To represent the difference of credit constraints,
I introduce a dummy that is equal to one if a household belongs to a SACCO, a saving and credit
cooperatives for smallholders; otherwise, zero. Similarly, I introduce a dummy on whether a household
belongs to a cooperative. I also include the experience of agricultural shocks, drought/flood and crop
disease, over the five years prior to the cultivation season. Farmers with those experiences may endeavor
to prevent these shocks by purchasing agricultural inputs.
Past information on regional maize price and rainfall is included in independent variables because
its expectations by farmers may affect the decisions to purchase inputs (Ricker-Gilbert et al. 2011).
Using open data of the Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping, World Food Programme (WFP VAM),
I obtain average wholesale price of maize per kilogram, six months prior to the cultivation season
15The fixed effects approach cannot be adapted to the Tobit model. Otherwise, an incidental parameters problem
would arise: estimated coefficients are inconsistent unless the number of time periods is large. (Wooldridge 2010).
16Some cultivated plots were not measured because respondents rejected the measurement or their plots were far. In
this case, I use acres reported by respondents.
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(September-February) in each region.17 Because the maize price in Pwani region is unavailable, I use
the averaged price between two adjacent regions of Dar es Salaam and Morogoro. Using the WFP VAM,
I also obtain the average rainfall and the standard deviation in the long rainy season (March-May)
over the previous five years.
In the same way, the CRE Probit and Tobit models are used to estimate the subsidy impact on
the probability for farmers to sell maize and their maize sales. The CRE Probit model is described by
the latent variable y∗it as
(4.2) y∗it = ψ + αvf,it + βvs,it + x
′
itγ + x
′
iξ + ai + eit,
where ai ∼ N(0, σ2a) conditional on (vf,it, vs,it,xit) and eit ∼ N(0, 1) conditional on (vf,it, vs,it,xit, ai)
for t = 1, 2 (Wooldridge 2010). We have yit = 1 if y
∗
it > 0; yit = 0 if y
∗
it ≤ 0. Some of the pre-
vious independent variables are excluded and changed in the analysis of farmer’s selling activities.
Because agricultural shocks directly decline crop sales by decreasing the harvests, I adopt experi-
ences of drought/flood and crop disease in the cultivation season, March-May in 2010 (Wave 2) and
2012 (Wave 3), instead of those over the previous five years before the cultivation season. Average
maize price before the cultivation is changed to that after the harvest (September-February), because
farmer’s decision to sell maize depends on the current maize price, rather than the past one. I exclude
the average rainfall and the standard deviation in the long rainy season over the previous five years;
instead, rainfall in the cultivation season in each wave is added because the rainfall itself, rather than
its expectation, affects farmers’ selling activities through harvested crops.
In the rest of this subsection, I discuss some data issues. First, the analysis is conducted at the
household level, not at the plot level. The main focus of the thesis is on farmers’ consumption of
agricultural inputs and their grain selling. Plot-level analysis is insufficient to grasp the whole behaviors
of farmers. Even if farmers redeem their vouchers, they may not invest subsidized inputs in maize
plots. Household-level analysis is more suitable to understand the comprehensive frame of household
behaviors than plot-level one.
The second data issue is why expenditure, instead of used quantity and purchased quantity of
agricultural inputs, is used in dependent variables. To capture farmers’ market activities, purchased
quantity is more desirable than expenditure because expenditure is affected by input price as well
as purchased quantity. I do not use purchased quantity because these information does not exist in
17The WFP VAM opens dataset associated with food security. The data is available at https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/
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the dataset in most agricultural inputs. I do not adopt used quantity either, because it differs from
purchased quantity. Farmers who purchased an input a year ago may use the rest in the next season.
They may obtain an input as a gift from their neighborhoods. Hence, expenditure is more appropriate
to capture market behaviors of farmers than used quantity. Another reason for not using used quantity
in the main analysis is integrating different types of inputs within one input category is difficult. For
example, there are various types of inorganic fertilizer: di-ammonium phosphate (DAP), urea, triple
super phosphate (TSP), sulphate of ammonium (SA), nitrogen phosphate of potassium (NPK), and
Minjingu rock phosphate (MRP). Another example is three types of labor in the dataset: female, male,
and child. Though the dataset contains working days of labor, it is problematic to regard eight hours
of male labor as the same as one hour of child labor. Integrating different types of quantities within
one input category to a single value may cause some errors.18
Third, price information of agricultural inputs is not included in the regression; instead, region and
year dummies are introduced. Regional price information by year is unavailable in most inputs. Dividing
expenditure by used quantity is a candidate to calculate input price at a regional level. However, it does
not produce accurate price information because used quantity is not purchased quantity. In addition,
integrating different types of inputs within one input category to a single price is problematic. This
thesis avoids obtaining price information by introducing year and regional dummies. The largest local
administrative unit in Tanzania is Region, followed by District, Ward, and Village. I introduce 21
region dummies in lieu of price information. These dummies are also included in the analysis of selling
activities.19
I next clarify the meaning of receiving a voucher in the dataset. The voucher receipt is not defined
to be subsidized quantity but to be a dummy variable, because the quantity is unavailable.20 One
possible interpretation of using a voucher dummy is beneficiary farmers face the decrease in the price
of subsidized inputs. Unfortunately, the dataset does not clarify whether a received voucher is redeemed.
However, receiving a voucher can be regarded as the decrease of input price, whose effects applies to all
recipients regardless of whether they redeem it or not. Thus, it is unnecessary to clarify the difference
18Despite the difficulties above, I attempt to create a single value of used quantity for each input when I discuss
the relationship between expenditure and used quantities in Section 5, and estimate farmers’ production efficiency in
Section 6.
19For robustness, I use a smaller administrative unit, Districts, for regional dummies instead of Regions. Introducing
Region dummies may be insufficient to control for regional differences of input price. Even though Region dummies are
replaced by District dummies, the results are unchanged.
20The two voucher dummies are created by the items in the questionnaire, “Did you receive a voucher/certificate for
any of this [FERTILIZER]/[SEED]? ” Since logistical challenges delayed the delivery of some vouchers, the government
issued certificates in 2011/12 so that beneficiaries could obtain subsidized inputs before the planting season started
(World Bank 2014).
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of receipt and redemption in this thesis.21
Finally, agricultural inputs treated in dependent variables comprise inorganic fertilizer, improved
maize seed, organic fertilizer, traditional maize seed, pesticide/herbicide, labor, capital. Inorganic fertil-
izer contains all types of fertilizers as well as urea and DAP, though subsidizing other types of fertilizers
is limited to a few areas (World Bank 2014). Hybrid maize seed is not discriminated from improved
one in the dataset. Thus, I regard them as the same “improved seed”.22 Pesticide and herbicide are
summed up to a single expenditure because they are not separated in the NPS. The expenditure in
labor is the total wage paid for hired labor in cultivation. The expenditure does not include shadow
wage for family labor. Capital expenditure is the sum of rental values of farm implement and machin-
ery: hand hoes, hand-powered sprayer, ox (for plough, seed planter, and cart) and tractor (for plough
and harrow). Information of purchasing capital is unavailable in the data.
All expenditures, maize sales, and some independent variables are transformed to the logarithmic
form, except dummies and small-valued variables. Log-transformation alleviates the violation of nor-
mality and homoskedasticity assumptions of Tobit and Probit models (Holden and Lunduka 2012). I
add one to original values before the log-transformation, so that the logarithmic values equal zero if
the original values are zero. Logarithmic variables are indicated as log in parenthesis in each regression
table.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1, I first show the number of beneficiaries for fertilizer and seed vouchers in two waves.
The beneficiary group constitutes 16.0 percent of the whole households in 2010/11 (135/845) and
9.2 percent in 2012/13 (78/845), which means the subsidy scale declined over two waves. Beneficiary
farmers seem to assign higher priority to inorganic fertilizer than improved seed. In both years, most
beneficiaries received a fertilizer voucher (nearly 90 percent), whereas beneficiaries for a seed voucher is
well below the half (roughly 30 percent). The considerably different proportions between two vouchers
is inconsistent with those reported in World Bank (2014), as mentioned in Subsection 2.2. These figures
indicate possible heterogeneity of two types of beneficiaries.23
21The survey by World Bank (2014) reported more than 90 percent of all distributed vouchers in the 2010/11 season
were redeemed and paid finally. It also reported the percentage of vouchers shared, sold, given away is 1.3 percent. As
far as this dataset is concerned, most fertilizer beneficiaries purchase fertilizer, whereas more than 80 percent of seed
beneficiaries purchase improved seed, as shown in summary statistics in the next subsection.
22By published documents concerning data information, we cannot determine whether the expenditure on subsidized
inputs is a discounted value.
23One possible reason for the large proportional difference is inorganic fertilizer is even more expensive than improved
seed (World Bank 2014). Beneficiaries may prioritize inorganic fertilizer, which they would not purchase without the
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Table 1: Number of Beneficiaries by Voucher Types and
Year
Type of voucher Wave 2 (2010/11) Wave 3 (2012/13)
Inorganic fertilizer 121 (0.90) 67 (0.86)
Improved seed 37 (0.27) 22 (0.28)
Both types 23 (0.17) 11 (0.14)
Total beneficiaries 135 78
Note: The proportion of beneficiaries for each voucher type
to the total beneficiaries by year in parenthesis
Table 2 presents the proportion of farmers who purchase each agricultural input and the average
expenditure by three groups and year: beneficiaries for each voucher type and non-beneficiaries in two
waves. Mean differences are tested between fertilizer/seed beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Fertilizer
and seed beneficiaries purchase both inorganic fertilizer and improved seed in much higher probability
and spend more on them than non-beneficiaries, though not all of the beneficiaries redeem their
vouchers. In the purchase of non-subsidized inputs, on the other hand, significant differences are not
consistent over both waves. For example, fertilizer and seed beneficiaries purchase pesticide/herbicide in
significantly higher probability and spend the larger expenditure than non-beneficiaries in Wave 2. But
this does not hold in Wave 3. Higher probability and larger expenditure in the wage of seed beneficiaries
in Wave 3 does not apply to Wave 2. Exceptionally, fertilizer beneficiaries purchase traditional seed in
smaller probability and spend lower expenditure than non-beneficiaries in both waves.24
Fertilizer beneficiaries in Table 2 include seed beneficiaries, and vice versa. Hence, receiving two
vouchers simultaneously provides mixed effects of two vouchers and disturbs the accurate understand-
ing of complementary relations among agricultural inputs. Table 3 presents the same statistics as
Table 2 for fertilizer beneficiaries who do not receive a seed voucher, seed beneficiaries who do not
receive a fertilizer voucher, and non-beneficiaries in two waves. Purchasing proportion and average
expenditure on improved seed by fertilizer beneficiaries without a seed voucher is relatively close to
those of non-beneficiaries in both waves. Consequently, significant differences in improved maize seed
disappear in fertilizer beneficiaries in Table 3. Thus, the high proportion and expenditure of fertil-
izer beneficiaries on improved seed in Table 2 is actually caused by the overlapping of receiving two
vouchers simultaneously. Similarly, Table 3 reveals that the high proportion and expenditure of seed
beneficiaries on inorganic fertilizer in Table 2 is also caused by the overlapping of two vouchers. Hence,
complementary relations between inorganic fertilizer and improved seed seem not to work well. In
subsidy. Another possible reason is fertilizer vouchers include two types of vouchers (urea and DAP), whereas seed
vouchers include only one type of a voucher. Consequently, more fertilizer vouchers are distributed than seed vouchers,
overall.
24I find striking low proportion in organic fertilizer and traditional maize seed in all groups because these inputs can
be supplied in farmers’ agricultural activities without market transaction.
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Table 2: Proportion of Farmers who Purchase Each Agricultural Input and Average Expenditure by
Non-/Beneficiaries and Year
Wave 2 (2010/11) Wave 3 (2012/13)
Fertilizer Seed Non- Fertilizer Seed Non-
Type of Input Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary
Proportion of farmers who purchase agricultural input
Subsidized inputs:
Inorganic fertilizer 1.00∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.12 0.99∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.16
Improved maize seed 0.22∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.10 0.34∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.16
Non-subsidized inputs:
Organic fertilizer 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06∗∗ 0.00 0.02
Traditional maize seed 0.03∗∗∗ 0.19 0.15 0.03∗∗∗ 0.09 0.15
Pesticide/herbicide 0.28∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.13
Pay Wage 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.46 0.64∗∗ 0.37
Farm implements 0.26 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.50∗∗ 0.26
Purchase any input:
Any agricultural input 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.60 0.99∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.65
Expenditure on agricultural inputs (Tanzanian shillings)
Subsidized inputs:
Inorganic fertilizer 85,933∗∗∗ 72,798∗∗∗ 11,967 106,707∗∗∗ 56,723 28,967
Improved maize seed 5,461∗∗∗ 22,722∗∗∗ 1,628 9,246∗ 24,091∗∗∗ 5,113
Non-subsidized inputs:
Organic fertilizer 1,404 81 1,052 2,284 0 1,043
Traditional maize seed 553 3,446∗∗∗ 1,061 597 1,250 1,542
Pesticide/herbicide 4,844 6,081 3,587 6,700 1,727 4,198
Total wage 27,884 27,622 26,296 61,888∗∗ 80,432∗∗ 36,265
Farm implements 3,157 4,189 5,875 14,537 21,364 10,302
Total expenditure:
All agricultural inputs 129,239∗∗∗ 136,938∗∗∗ 51,466 185,586∗∗∗ 180,452∗∗ 87,430
Observations 121 37 710 67 22 767
Note: Mean Differences are tested between fertilizer/seed beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries by year at significant
levels of ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
the purchase of non-subsidized inputs in Table 3, on the other hand, I find similar figures to those
in Table 2, though some significant differences disappear because of small number of observations in
restricted beneficiary groups.
Overall, there are no consistent complementary relations among agricultural inputs in the sum-
mary statistics. Farmers’ behaviors seem to change only in the consumption of subsidized inputs.
Consequently, subsidized inputs contribute to the large differences of the total expenditure between
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in Table 2 and Table 3.
In Table 4, I next see the proportion of farmers who sell crops and the average sales by year in
the same three groups as Table 2.25 Table 4 reveals high participation of Tanzanian farmers in crop
markets. The percentage of beneficiaries who sell crops is nearly 80 percent, whereas that of non-
beneficiaries is close to 70 percent. Beneficiaries have higher participation rate over non-beneficiaries
in Cereals/tubers/roots, especially in maize markets. Sales of cereals/tubers/roots and maize in two
beneficiary groups are also obviously higher than those in non-beneficiary group. I find no high par-
ticipation of beneficiaries in other crop types. A few beneficiaries who sell vegetables/fruits and cash
crops just contribute to high average sales of these crops.
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of two groups. The left-hand side in each wave shows benefi-
25The construction of crop types is based on the category of the NPS questionnaire. Maize is a part of Cere-
als/tubers/roots. For the questionnaire, see https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2252
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Table 3: Proportion to Purchase Agricultural Input and Average Expenditure by Beneficiary with Either
One of Fertilizer or Seed Voucher
Wave 2 (2010/11) Wave 3 (2012/13)
Fertilizer Seed Non- Fertilizer Seed Non-
Type of Input Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary
Proportion to purchase
Subsidized inputs:
Inorganic fertilizer 1.00∗∗∗ 0.14 0.12 0.98∗∗∗ 0.18 0.16
Improved maize seed 0.08 0.79∗∗∗ 0.10 0.21 0.82∗∗∗ 0.16
Non-subsidized inputs:
Organic fertilizer 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.07∗∗∗ 0.00 0.02
Traditional maize seed 0.00∗∗∗ 0.21 0.15 0.02∗∗∗ 0.09 0.15
Pesticide/herbicide 0.26∗∗∗ 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.13
Pay Wage 0.38 0.43 0.33 0.43 0.64∗ 0.37
Farm implements 0.27 0.36 0.21 0.25 0.45 0.26
Purchase any input:
Any agricultural input 1.00∗∗∗ 1.00∗ 0.60 0.98∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 0.65
Expenditure on (Tanzanian shillings)
Subsidized inputs:
Inorganic fertilizer 82,249∗∗∗ 25,430 11,967 108,597∗∗∗ 16,364 28,967
Improved maize seed 1,396 22,621∗∗∗ 1,628 6,286 23,864∗∗∗ 5,113
Non-subsidized inputs:
Organic fertilizer 1,704 0 1,052 2,732 0 1,043
Traditional maize seed 0∗∗ 4,321∗∗ 1,061 268∗ 227 1,542
Pesticide/herbicide 3,991 2,142 3,587 7,623 1,455 4,198
Total wage 30,735 47,143 26,296 54,464 61,182 36,265
Farm implements 3,041 5,071 5,875 11,500 12,727 10,302
Total expenditure:
All agricultural inputs 123,116∗∗∗ 106,730∗ 51,466 191,470∗∗∗ 115,818 87,430
Observations 98 14 710 56 11 767
Note: Fertilizer beneficiaries are ones who do not receive a seed but a fertilizer voucher. Seed beneficiaries are
ones who do not receive a fertilizer but a seed voucher. Mean Differences are tested between fertilizer/seed
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries by year at significant levels of ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
Table 4: Proportion of Farmers who Sell Crop and Average Sales by Non-/Beneficiary and Year
Wave 2 (2010/11) Wave 3 (2012/13)
Fertilizer Seed Non- Fertilizer Seed Non-
Type of Crop Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary Beneficiary
Proportion of farmers who sell crop
Any crop 0.80∗∗∗ 0.70 0.67 0.79∗∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.65
Cereal/tuber/roots 0.69∗∗∗ 0.62∗ 0.47 0.69∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.43
Maize 0.55∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.35 0.57∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.32
Legume/Oil 0.35 0.27 0.31 0.45∗ 0.46 0.35
Vegetables/Fruits 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03
Cash Crops 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.06∗ 0.05 0.14
Crop sales (Tanzanian shillings)
All crops 315,930∗∗∗ 182,510 194,190 359,146 377,468 256,048
Cereal/tuber/roots 215,613∗∗∗ 136,955∗ 80,014 287,627∗∗∗ 216,455 128,583
Maize 119,442∗∗∗ 128,973∗∗∗ 38,797 177,806∗∗∗ 181,909∗∗∗ 64,397
Legume/Oil 30,697 29,339 48,271 51,072 88,741 53,652
Vegetables/Fruits 3,810 0 11,612 1,791 49,545∗∗ 6,009
Cash Crops 72,421 19,784 58,603 23,896 22,727 73,278
Observations 121 37 710 67 22 767
Note: Mean Differences are tested between fertilizer/seed beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries by year at significant
levels of ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Beneficiary and Non-beneficiary Households by Year
Wave 2 (2010/11) Wave 3 (2012/13)
Mean Values of Variables Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary
Household characteristics:
Adult equivalents 4.48 4.56 4.51 4.55
Male-headed household (dummy) 0.81 0.77 0.80 0.77
Age of household head 47.67 48.47 47.76 50.66
Education years of household head 5.89∗∗∗ 4.50 5.94∗∗∗ 4.67
Acres of cultivated land 6.58 7.18 6.69 7.35
Acres of cultivated maize land 3.07 3.16 3.07 3.28
Weighted average of subjective soil quality 1.78 1.77 1.35 1.31
Distance to nearest agricultural market (km) 74.15∗∗ 85.67 73.84∗ 84.95
Resides in urban areas (dummy) 0.19∗ 0.13 0.24∗∗ 0.14
Belongs to SACCO (dummy) 0.09∗∗ 0.05 0.13∗∗∗ 0.04
Belongs to cooperative (dummy) 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.09
Experienced drought/flood over five years (dummy) 0.13∗∗ 0.21 0.09∗∗ 0.19
Experienced crop disease over five years (dummy) 0.08∗∗ 0.15 0.13∗ 0.07
Experienced drought/flood in cultivation (dummy) 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02
Experienced crop disease in cultivation (dummy) 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Regional characteristics:
Avg. maize price over six months before cultivation 357.39∗∗∗ 420.23 348.98∗∗∗ 401.23
Avg. maize price over six months after harvest 297.38∗∗∗ 326.44 604.55∗∗∗ 665.70
Avg. masika-rainfall over past five years (mm) 407.74∗∗∗ 365.24 401.42∗∗∗ 359.26
Sd. of masika-rainfall over past five years 102.52∗∗∗ 84.75 80.87∗∗∗ 68.97
Rainfall in cultivation season (mm) 363.47 360.19 341.69 329.45
Observations 135 710 78 767
Note: Mean Differences are tested between two groups by year at significant levels of ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.
ciary households who receive a voucher of either inorganic fertilizer or improved seed; the right-hand
side shows non-beneficiary ones who receive neither of them. It also tests mean differences between
the two groups by t-tests. Urban households with a well-educated head tend to receive a voucher. This
may suggest the beneficiary-selecting process is in favor of socially advantaged households. On the
other hand, recipients tend to be smaller-scale farmers, though the difference is not significant. What
is more, the proportional difference of belonging to a SACCO group indicates farmers who afford to
co-finance top-up payment uncovered in the subsidy receive a voucher. Hence, the beneficiary-selecting
process follows the program criteria partly, but with some inequalities.
Low tendency for beneficiaries to experience drought/flood and crop disease suggests less agri-
cultural shocks arise in agriculturally high potential areas, which are mainly targeted in the NAIVS
program. This is supported by the significantly larger average rainfall in the long rainy season (masika)
in beneficiaries’ regions. The larger standard deviation of rainfall for beneficiaries seems to arise be-
cause of the absolutely larger average rainfall than that for non-beneficiaries, though the large deviation
means unstable production for farmers. Finally, average wholesale maize price per kilogram is lower in
beneficiary regions than in non-beneficiary ones. The difference is caused by abundantly supplied maize
and high market competition in agriculturally high potential areas. Maize price before cultivation tend
to be higher than that after harvest because maize is abundant in markets after harvest but is scarce
before cultivation.
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5 Results
5.1 Farmer’s Expenditure in Agricultural Input Market
Each column of Table 6 presents results of the CRE Tobit model where expenditure on each agricultural
input is regressed on two types of vouchers and other household characteristics. In Column (8), the
total expenditure on all the agricultural inputs is regressed. Time-averaged values, the constant and
region dummies are included in the estimation but omitted from Table 6 for brevity. Standard errors
are obtained using bootstrapping with 250 repetitions.
Because coefficients in a nonlinear model does not represent marginal effects, I calculate the Average
Partial Effect (APE) to estimate subsidy impacts. For the calculation of APE for discrete changes in
the CRE Tobit, letm(c, σ2) = Φ( cσ )+σϕ(
c
σ ) with the standard normal cumulative density function Φ(·)
and the standard normal probability density function ϕ(·). I denote an estimated coefficient by adding
a hat on the top of the coefficient. To calculate the APE of a fertilizer voucher under equation (4.1),
for example, we evaluate
N−1
N∑
i=1
m(ψ̂ + α̂vf,it + β̂vs,it + x
′
itγ̂ + x
′
iξ̂, σ̂
2
a +
ˆσ2u)
for vf,it = 1 and vf,it = 0 and form the difference (Wooldridge 2010). Be careful the APE expresses a
percentage change because all expenditures are in the logarithmic form.
In Column (1) of Table 6, I find voucher recipients for inorganic fertilizer significantly increase its
expenditure. The APE of receiving a fertilizer voucher is roughly 2.0 in both years, which means the
average beneficiary increases the expenditure on inorganic fertilizer by 200 percent. Similarly, Column
(2) shows beneficiaries for improved seed significantly increase its expenditure. The APE is 3.19 in 2010
and 4.44 in 2012, which means the average farmer increases the expenditure on improved seed by more
than 300 percent if the farmer receives a seed voucher. However, the considerably increased expenditure
on subsidized inputs does not influence the expenditure on non-subsidized inputs. In Columns (3) - (7)
of Table 6, receiving a voucher does not significantly affects the expenditure on non-subsidized inputs.
The result of Column (6) in Table 6 is partly consistent with Ricker-Gilbert (2014), which showed the
Malawi’s FISP did not affect the number of agricultural labor days demanded by a household.
To provide supplementary interpretation of Table 6, I also conduct the CRE Probit estimation
by changing the input expenditures to dummy variables: if the expenditure is positive, the value is
25
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one; otherwise, it is zero. Using the CRE Probit model, I investigate the decisions for beneficiaries to
purchase each agricultural input. I additionally apply truncated normal regression model to restrict
attention to non-zero expenditure. Because of the lack of panel methods in a truncated model, I
combine a pooled truncated model with the CRE device. Using the truncated model, I examine how
much expenditure beneficiaries spend after deciding to purchase each agricultural input. These results
are presented in Table 7 and Table 8. The APE of receiving a voucher in the CRE Probit model under
equation (4.2) is calculated by forming the difference of
N−1
N∑
i=1
Φ
((√
1 + σ̂2a
)−1 (
ψ̂ + α̂vf,it + β̂vs,it + x
′
itγ̂ + x
′
iξ̂
))
for vf,it and vs,it (Wooldridge 2010). In the CRE Probit model, standard errors are default values
in Stata because bootstrapping failures arise in Probit estimation. In the truncated model, standard
errors are obtained by clustering at household level.
Supplementary estimations of Probit and truncated models identify where the tremendous increases
of subsidized inputs in Table 6 result from. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7, obtained by the CRE
Probit model, reveal that receiving fertilizer and seed vouchers significantly increases the probability
for farmers to purchase the respective subsidized inputs. The APE of receiving fertilizer voucher is 0.44
in 2010/11 and 0.45 in 2012/13, whereas the APE of receiving a seed voucher is 0.46 in 2010/11 and
0.52 in 2012/13. Hence, the probability for farmers to purchase subsidized inputs increases by more
than 40 percent if the farmers are subsidized. On the other hand, the positive significance does not
hold in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8, which is obtained by the CRE truncated normal model. These
results of Table 7 and Table 8 suggest that beneficiaries are more likely to purchase subsidized inputs
than non-beneficiaries. After deciding to purchase subsidized inputs, however, receiving a voucher does
not significantly affect the purchased amount of subsidized inputs. In other words, the NAIVS program
affects whether to purchase subsidized inputs, whereas it does not influence how much subsidized input
to buy after the purchase decision. One possible reason for this is subsidized quantities are determined
in advance: 50 kg for inorganic fertilizer and 10 kg for improved maize seed. Beneficiaries do not have an
incentive to purchase more than stipulated amount of subsidized inputs. Therefore, the large values of
the APE aforementioned is attributed to the participation of beneficiaries in the market of subsidized
inputs.
In Columns (3)-(7) of Table 7 and Table 8, I find some differences from results of Table 6. Receiving
27
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a seed voucher significantly increased the probability to purchase traditional seed. The APE is around
0.15 in both waves. This result is difficult to interpret because improved maize seed should be pre-
ferred to traditional one in modern agricultural production. One possibility is the seed voucher induced
farmers to visit input sellers and purchase commercial seed including traditional seed.26 Another ex-
ception is receiving a fertilizer voucher significantly declines the use of organic fertilizer in Column (3)
of Table 8. Farmers substitute inorganic fertilizer and improved seed for organic fertilizer, though they
purchase organic fertilizer. The insignificance of two vouchers in Column (6) of Table 7 is inconsistent
with the main result of Ricker-Gilbert (2014), which showed the FISP had a small positive impact on
the probability for a household to demand agricultural labor with approaching statistical significance.
I further discuss the relationship between expenditure and used quantity of agricultural inputs
because expenditure expresses farmers’ market transaction, whereas used quantity represents their ac-
tivities in production. By examining the differences, I evaluate whether farmer’s agricultural production
was commercialized by the subsidy. To investigate this, I estimate used quantity of each agricultural
input on two voucher dummies by using the same CRE Tobit model.
To construct used quantity, I integrate different types of inputs within one input category to a
single value, despite possible statistical errors. If a farmer uses multiple types of inorganic fertilizers, I
sum up the amount of nitrogen contained in each fertilizer.27 Unfortunately, the information on used
quantities of improved and traditional maize seed is not contained in the Wave 2 (2010/11). Because
the regional price information of improved maize seed exists in both waves, I construct the purchased
quantity of improved seed by dividing the expenditure by the regional price. I adopt the purchased
quantity above as the used quantity of improved seed, though the two quantities are different in notion.
Because I do not have price data on traditional seed, I exclude its used quantity from estimation. Types
of organic fertilizer and pesticide/herbicide are not described in the dataset. Hence, I just sum the
used quantities for these inputs. The amount of labor is summed up to the total number of labor days
per household, regardless of different types of labor (female, male, and child) and different labor hours
per day. In estimation, I separate family labor and hired labor because these two types of labor are
differently treated in farmers’ production decisions, as shown in Section 3. I evaluate the used amount
26The significance of receiving a seed voucher in traditional seed may also result from the fact I do not adopt boot-
strapping to estimate standard errors.
27For nutrient components, I refer to Benson et al. (2012), which collected fertilizers at retail shops in Tanzania.
Nutrient content is expressed as x - y - z, where x, y, z represent the proportion of nutrients for nitrogen (N), phosphate
(P2O5), kalium (K2O), respectively. I adopt 46-0-0 for urea, 18-46-0 for di-ammonium phosphate (DAP), 0-28-0 for
Minjingu rock phosphate (MRP), 0-45-0 for triple super phosphate (TSP), 26-0-0 for calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN),
21-0-0 for sulphate of ammonium (SA), and 20-10-10 for nitrogen phosphate pottassium (NKP). To obtain the application
level of nitrogen in a household, used quantity of fertilizer (kg) is multiplied by the corresponding first percentage (x)
and summed up over all types of consumed fertilizers within each household.
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of capital by adding the values of owned farm implements and machinery into the payment to rent or
borrow them.28 Finally, these used quantities are transformed into the logarithmic form.
In Table 9, used quantities of each agricultural input are estimated on two types of vouchers and
other household characteristics by the CRE Tobit model. I find consistent results with those of Table 6
in inorganic fertilizer, improved seed, organic fertilizer, and pesticide/herbicide. The APE of receiving
a fertilizer voucher on the used quantity of nitrogen is around 0.67 in both years, whereas that of
receiving a seed voucher on the quantity of improved seed is 0.63 in Wave 2 and 0.89 in Wave 3.29
I find no significance in the used quantity of organic fertilizer. This is consistent with Holden and
Lunduka (2012), which shows the Malawi’s subsidy for fertilizer did not affect the probability and
intensity of manure use significantly.
In Columns (5) and (7), on the other hand, receiving a fertilizer voucher significantly increases
family-labor days with the APEs 0.16, and the values of owned and borrowed farm implements with
the APEs 0.27 in both waves.30 In Column (6), however, hired-labor days are not significantly increased
by receiving a voucher. Farmers addressed increased workload concerning inorganic fertilizer by mainly
using family labor instead of hired labor. Farmers may have saved cash transfer by avoiding market
transactions, or assigned crucial workloads of applying fertilizer to family labor, rather than hired
labor. The significant result in Column (7) may result from the increase of simple implements, which
farmers can manufacture by themselves. In Table 13 of Supplementary Appendix, I further separate
farm implements into hand hoes, hand-powered sprayers, oxen, and tractors by ownership and estimate
the values of each type of farm implements. Then, Table 13 shows fertilizer beneficiaries significantly
increased values of owned hand hoes.31 Family labor and part of farm implements can be supplied by
farmers themselves without market transaction.
28In these definitions of labor and capital, family-labor days and amount of farm implements are positive in almost
all farmers. Hence, a fixed-effects linear model can be used for estimation in these inputs. However, I still use the CRE
Tobit model in labor and capital because the results are almost unchanged.
29The APEs are even less than those in expenditure, as discussed earlier. If purchased quantity were available in the
dataset, I would form the difference between used quantity and purchased quantity and verify farmers did not use all the
subsidized amounts in the single cultivation season. On the other hand, the differences of APEs may also result from
the difference of two measured units, expenditure and used quantity. Expenditure is affected by input price, as well as
purchased quantity.
30We must be careful owned farm implements are not necessarily used in production. Owned and borrowed implements
does not represent used quantity of capital accurately.
31Other results in Table 13 show seed beneficiaries significantly increase values of owned hand-powered sprayer and
values of borrowed tractors. Hand-powered sprayers are used to apply liquid substances such as fertilizer and pesti-
cide/herbicide. The p-value of receiving a seed voucher in Column (5) of Table 6 is relatively close to the significance
level of ten percent. Hence, seed beneficiaries may purchase hand-powered sprayers, along with pesticide/herbicide. Trac-
tors are used for plough and harrow. Improved seed may be more vulnerable to low-quality soils than traditional seed
and growing improved seed may require well-plowed fields. Bellon and Taylor (1993) examined the relationship between
the folk soil taxonomy and farmers’ maize variety selection in Mexico. They showed farmers significantly favored local
maize varieties over improved varieties in poorer-quality soils, whereas the farmers favored improved varieties over local
varieties in higher-quality lands.
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In summary, the subsidy promoted farmers to participate in agricultural input markets, mainly
through their purchases of subsidized inputs. As a result, total expenditure on all agricultural inputs
significantly increased by the subsidy, as in Column (8) of Table 6. Beneficiaries do not increase nor
decrease the consumption of non-subsidized inputs in market activities. Hence, complementary rela-
tions in purchase are low between subsidized and non-subsidized inputs in Tanzanian farmers, which is
consistent with the findings of Sheahan and Barrett (2017). In input use, on the other hand, comple-
mentary relations partly hold in self-supplied inputs, such as labor and capital. Farmers may respond
to increased demands for inputs flexibly if the inputs can be supplied without market transaction. This
suggests the subsidy is weak to commercialize farmers’ use of inputs. The subsidy stimulate farmers’
commercial activities only through the purchase of subsidized inputs.
5.2 Farmer’s Selling Activities in Grain Market
Table 10 displays results of whether receiving a voucher affects the probability for farmers to sell maize
and their maize sales in Columns (1) and (2). Here, standard errors are default values in Stata, because
bootstrapping failures arise in Probit estimation.32
In Columns (1) and (2), neither the probability to sell maize nor the amount of maize sales is higher
for beneficiaries than non-beneficiaries. This result is surprising because Table 4 shows the large differ-
ence in the proportion and the amount of maize sales between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. One
possible reason for the insignificance is beneficiaries had already sold maize in markets before subsi-
dized. To explain this, I also report the coefficients of two time-averaged voucher dummies in Table 10.
Practically, time-averaged values are considered a part of time-invariant characteristics of farmers be-
cause time-averaged values xi remove the correlation between independent variables (vf,it, vs,it,xit)
and farmer’s heterogeneity ai in equation (4.1). In this case, time-averaged voucher dummies represent
farmer’s economic and social status to be eligible for the subsidy. Because the coefficient of the time-
averaged fertilizer voucher is significantly positive, farmers who are eligible for the subsidy tend to sell
maize and achieve high maize sales. Hence, farmers who had sold maize in markets before subsidized
were likely chosen so that their sufficient income source could guarantee the top-up payment of subsi-
dized inputs. The subsidy may have insufficient room to expand farmers’ selling activities because of
its beneficiary-selecting process.33
32Introducing many dummy variables such as region dummies affects re-sampling failures in bootstrapping. For ro-
bustness, I estimate the CRE Probit model without region dummies by using bootstrapped standard errors with 250
repetitions. I still obtain the same results as Table 10.
33In fact, I obtain a significant coefficient in the fertilizer voucher dummy if two time-averaged voucher dummies are
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Table 10: CRE Probit and Tobit Estimates of Probability to Sell and Sales in Grain Markets on
Voucher Dummies
Maize Crops except maize
(1) Probit (2) Tobit (3) Probit (4) Tobit
Explanatory Variables Sell Maize Maize Sales Sell Crops Crop Sales
Received fertilizer voucher
(dummy)
-0.145
(0.514)
-0.279
(0.452)
0.265
(0.285)
1.003
(0.402)
Received seed voucher (dummy) 0.403
(0.181)
0.618
(0.206)
0.130
(0.717)
0.052
(0.975)
Adult equivalents -0.079
(0.172)
-0.135
(0.183)
0.092
(0.109)
-0.085
(0.766)
Male-headed household
(dummy)
0.285∗∗
(0.026)
0.534∗∗
(0.021)
0.078
(0.587)
1.544∗∗
(0.044)
Age of household head -0.034
(0.457)
-0.059
(0.458)
0.012
(0.803)
-0.196
(0.420)
Education years of household
head
0.023
(0.599)
0.042
(0.585)
-0.039
(0.369)
0.014
(0.949)
Acres of cultivated land 0.014
(0.143)
0.020
(0.175)
-0.015
(0.201)
-0.008
(0.851)
Weighted average of subjective
soil quality
0.082
(0.217)
0.144
(0.217)
-0.149∗∗
(0.036)
0.205
(0.564)
Distance to nearest agricultural
market (km) (log)
0.787
(0.219)
1.147
(0.276)
0.539
(0.396)
4.522
(0.147)
Resides in urban ares (dummy) 0.278
(0.748)
0.596
(0.689)
-0.033
(0.974)
0.087
(0.986)
Belongs to SACCO (dummy) 0.014
(0.966)
0.045
(0.939)
-0.689∗∗
(0.035)
-2.475
(0.139)
Belongs to cooperative
(dummy)
0.209
(0.220)
0.366
(0.219)
0.099
(0.571)
1.126
(0.194)
Experienced drought/flood in
cultivation season (dummy)
-1.290∗∗
(0.021)
-2.444∗∗
(0.013)
-0.284
(0.542)
-4.527∗∗
(0.035)
Experienced crop disease in cul-
tivation season (dummy)
0.624
(0.326)
1.279
(0.264)
-0.312
(0.598)
0.432
(0.873)
Avg. maize price over six months
after harvest (log)
0.266
(0.801)
0.411
(0.826)
-0.542
(0.633)
-9.586∗
(0.097)
Rainfall in cultivation season
(mm) (log)
-1.017∗∗∗
(0.006)
-1.811∗∗∗
(0.004)
1.260∗∗∗
(0.001)
4.124∗∗
(0.034)
In Wave 3 (2012/13) (dummy) -0.266
(0.731)
-0.413
(0.764)
0.422
(0.613)
8.185∗
(0.054)
Time-average of fertilizer
voucher dummy
0.853∗∗∗
(0.008)
1.528∗∗∗
(0.005)
-0.682∗
(0.069)
-0.079
(0.966)
Time-average of seed voucher
dummy
-0.050
(0.918)
-0.091
(0.912)
-0.960
(0.122)
-4.546
(0.121)
σ̂a 0.830 1.534 1.010 5.821
σ̂u 2.081 7.106
Note: Sample Size: N = 1, 690. Significant levels: ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01 with p-values in
parenthesis. Standard errors are default values in Stata. Columns (1) and (2) concern selling and sales
of maize; Columns (3) and (4) concern those of all crops but maize. Time-averaged values, the
constant and region dummies are omitted from the table. Exceptionally, two time-averaged values of
fertilizer and seed voucher dummies are included in the table.
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Table 11: Proportion of Farmers who Sell Maize and Average Maize Sales by Beneficiary Type
and Year
Wave 2 (2010/11) Wave 3 (2012/13)
Beneficiary Type Sell Maize Maize Sales Sell Maize Maize Sales
Beneficiary only in Wave 2 0.49 93,139 0.48 175,611
Beneficiary only in Wave 3 0.42 87,058 0.38 151,577
Non-beneficiary in both waves 0.34 36,963 0.30 50.901
Note: The first beneficiary type comprises 83 beneficiaries who received a voucher in Wave 2
but did not receive it in Wave 3. The second beneficiary type comprises 26 beneficiaries who
did not receive a voucher in Wave 2 but received it in Wave 3. The last beneficiary type
comprises 684 non-beneficiaries in both waves.
The statistics concerning farmers’ maize-selling activities suggest this beneficiary-selecting process.
Table 11 presents the proportions and maize sales of three types of beneficiary groups in each wave:
beneficiaries who received a voucher only in Wave 2, beneficiaries who received a voucher only in
Wave 3, and non-beneficiaries who did not receive a voucher in either wave. Table 11 shows the
proportion of maize-selling beneficiaries who received a voucher only in Wave 2 decreased hardly after
the subsidy graduation. On the other hand, maize-selling beneficiaries who received a voucher only in
Wave 3 did not increase by becoming eligible for the subsidy in Wave 3. The average sales of non-
beneficiaries considerably increased in Wave 3. Hence, the the average maize sales in the two beneficiary
groups seem to have increased in Wave 3 largely by the upward trend of maize sales nationwide in
Tanzania. Therefore, Table 11 suggests the subsidy did not positively nor negatively affect farmers’
selling activities.34 Because the proportion and average maize sales in the two beneficiary groups
outnumber those in the non-beneficiary group, the subsidy was likely to select active farmers in grain
markets.
Another possible reason for the insignificance in Table 10 is the subsidy did not raise maize pro-
duction sufficiently for beneficiaries to sell the surplus. In Column (9) of Table 6, I regress the total
harvested amount of maize on the same independent variables as Table 6 at household level by using a
linear CRE model. Because receiving a voucher did not significantly increase the total maize harvested
within a household, the subsidy seems not to produce maize surplus enough to sell to markets. In
the next section, I estimate farmers’ production function by using a Stochastic Frontier model. The
results there reveal farmers’ production responds weakly to the application of inorganic fertilizer and
improved seed.35
excluded in estimation. This suggests time-averaged values deprive original voucher dummies of significance.
34Recall the NAIVS program initially targeted agriculturally high potential areas, and then expanded nationwide.
Hence, we find the larger proportion and average maize sales in preceding beneficiaries than following beneficiaries.
35It is also possible some beneficiaries consumed increased maize production by themselves. However, we cannot ver-
ify self-consumption because of data limitation. In Wave 2, average annual consumption on domestic food is 1,612,298
shillings for beneficiaries who sell crops and 1,711,594 shillings for ones who do not sell, whereas it is 2,144,625 and
2,895,816 in Wave 3. The larger food consumption of non-selling beneficiaries may result from their higher living stan-
dards, not from self-consumption. The average proportion of annual domestic food consumption to the total living
35
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 10, I change crop types from maize to all crops but maize to
clarify spillover effects of the subsidy. Invested fertilizer may benefit other crops cultivated in maize
plots. Farmers may also invest subsidized fertilizer in plots without maize production. Then, examining
maize selling and its sales is insufficient to evaluate the subsidy impact on farmers’ activities in crop
markets. In Columns (3) and (4), I find no significance for receiving a voucher. Hence, the subsidy
effects did not spread to selling activities of other crops.
5.3 Robustness Check
In this subsection, I conduct the same estimations as the previous two subsections under stricter
data conditions so that the dataset consists of more homogeneous farmers. All results are presented
in Supplementary Appendix. Two dataset restrictions are conducted in this thesis. Both the data
restrictions are again arranged in a balanced panel.
First, I limit the dataset to 12 agriculturally high potential regions where the NAIVS program was
initially introduced.36 Because Tanzania covers a geographically wide area, the results in the previous
subsections may depend on environmental and agronomic differences. Table 14 and Table 15 show the
regional difference does not matter in this thesis.37
The other data restriction excludes farmers whose cultivated acres for maize occupy less than half
their total cultivated acres. After the exclusion, the average acres of total cultivated land becomes 3.96.
Hence, the average household in this dataset are small-scale farmers, compared with the average farmer
in Table 5 before the data restriction. Table 16 and Table 17 show similar results in subsidized inputs.
However, receiving a fertilizer voucher increases the expenditure on improved seed at the significance
level of ten percent. Though the high correlation of two voucher dummies may contribute to the
significance, complementary relations between two subsidized inputs may work well in farmers who
focus on maize production.
consumption is 0.74 for selling beneficiaries and 0.60 for non-selling ones in Wave 2, whereas it is 0.71 and 0.64 in Wave
3. The proportion of non-selling beneficiaries is lower than that of selling beneficiaries, despite the larger consumption
of domestic food in non-selling beneficiaries. The empirical problem to verify self-consumption is we cannot discriminate
the domestic consumption of maize produced by farmers from that of food which is purchased outside.
36Iringa, Mbyeya, Ruvuma, and Rukwa in southern regions; Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Manyara, Kigoma, Tabora, Mara,
and Morogoro in the central and northern regions (World Bank 2014). Pwani was added a year later.
37Furthermore, I limit the dataset to central and northern regions of Tanzania on one hand, and to southern regions
on the other hand. The results are almost unchanged.
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6 Production Efficiency of Subsidized Farmers
This section investigates whether the NAIVS program affected the efficiency of farmers’ production.
Recall that the average beneficiary farmer considerably increased the consumption of inorganic fertilizer
and improved seed, without the significant change of non-subsidized input consumption except labor
and capital. Beneficiaries may excessively invest in cheap subsidized inputs by sacrificing the use of non-
subsidized inputs, which distorts the efficient allocation of production factors. Hence, input-subsidy
programs must be evaluated in terms of production efficiency.
This thesis estimates subsidy impacts on farmers’ production efficiency by using a Stochastic Fron-
tier (SF) model.38 Suppose that a farmer i has a production function f(xi;β), where xi is a vector of
inputs and β is a vector of parameters. Ideally, farmer i would produce output along the production
frontier f(xi;β). In reality, each farmer faces obstacles leading to production inefficiency that lowers
output level. Each farmer is also exposed to random shocks that fluctuate the production level. This
notion is described as f(xi;β) exp(vi − ui), where ui represents technical inefficiency and vi repre-
sents an idiosyncratic error as random shocks. By assuming ui is non-negatively distributed, we have
0 < exp(−ui) ≤ 1, which means ui determines the level of production inefficiency. Taking the loga-
rithm, the output yi = f(xi;β) exp(vi − ui) is written as log yi = log{f(xi;β)} + vi − ui. Extending
the model to panel data, I estimate the technical inefficiency ui and investigate whether the subsidy
affected it.
There are a variety of panel data models in SF approach, depending on distributions of error terms
and formulation of model structure (Belotti et al. 2013; Kumbhakar et al. 2014). This thesis adopts
Wang (2002), which allows the mean and variance of technical inefficiency to depend on exogenous
variables. It also allows an idiosyncratic error to be heteroskedastic. Following Kumbhakar et al. (2014)
for model representation, I estimate the following model in this thesis:
log yijt = log{f(xijt;β)}+ vijt − uijt,(6.1)
uijt ∼ N+(µijt, σ2ijt) = N+
(
δ0 + z
′
ijtδ, exp(ωu0 + z
′
u,ijtωu)
)
,(6.2)
vijt ∼ N(0, σ2v,ijt) = N
(
0, exp(ωv0 + z
′
v,ijtωv)
)
,(6.3)
where N+(·) is a truncated normal distribution. The estimation unit is newly arranged at plot j of
38A recent literature that applied SF to agriculture is Abdul-Salam and Phimister (2017), which tested whether access
to information affected the efficiency of small-scale agriculture in Uganda. I refer to some discussions in Abdul-Salam
and Phimister (2017) in this section.
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farmer i in period t, because productivity is determined by inherent soil quality of each plot. For accu-
rate analysis of agricultural productivity, household-unit estimation is insufficient to measure technical
efficiency. From equation (6.2) and (6.3), we see the mean and variance of technical inefficiency, uijt,
are functions of zijt and zu,ijt, respectively, whereas the variance of the idiosyncratic error vijt is a
function of zv,ijt.
The strength of Wang (2002) approach is to avoid bias problem caused by two-step procedures
for estimating the impact of exogenous variables on technical inefficiency. In the traditional approach,
the stochastic frontier model is first estimated on production factors to obtain estimated technical
inefficiency. Then, the estimated technical inefficiency is regressed on a set of exogenous variables in
the second step. Wang and Schmidt (2002) showed that this two-step procedure leads to severely
biased results because the estimated model in the first step is misspecified. The first step procedure is
subject to the correlation between independent variables in the first step and exogenous ones in the
second step. Hence, ignoring exogenous variables in the first step causes an omitted variables problem.
In contrast, the SF model proposed by Wang (2002) comprises a single-step procedure to avoid model
misspecification. Another advantage of Wang’s model allows non-monotonicity effects of exogenous
variables on technical inefficiency (Wang 2002; Kumbhakar et al. 2014). For example, age of household
head may have a positive effect on productivity until a certain point, whereas it may have a negative
effect afterwards. Expressing the mean and variance of technical inefficiency in a linearly parameterized
form as equation (6.2) is beneficial to flexibly understand the relationship between exogenous variables
and technical inefficiency.39
To estimate the equations (6.1)-(6.3) by the Wang (2002) approach, the dataset is newly constructed
at the plot level from the same two waves of the National Panel Survey (2010/11 and 2012/13). The
dataset restriction follows the same procedure as Subsection 4.1. The dataset is restricted to plots with
maize production in the mainland of Tanzania in the long rainy season. I eliminate outliers by dropping
households with more than 99 percentiles of harvested maize and used quantities of agricultural inputs
per acre. Finally, I obtain a balanced panel of 903 plots in each wave.
To estimate the production inefficiency in equation (6.1) accurately, I measure output yijt by the
harvested quantity of maize per acre and inputs xijt by used quantities of agricultural inputs per acre.
39Other alternative SF models for panel data are true-fixed and true-random effects frontier models in (Greene 2005a,b),
which attempt to separate time-constant component from technical efficiency. However, there are some technical problems
in this method. In particular, an incidental parameters problem is a critical issue, because the period length of the panel
data is two in this thesis. Belotti and Ilardi (2012) showed true-fixed effects model using a computationally feasible
method (maximum-likelihood dummy variable approach) is appropriate only if the length of the panel is at least ten.
Hence, this thesis does not adopt these models.
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Be careful that I do not use maize sales nor input expenditure. Similarly to Subsection 5.1, I integrate
different types of inputs within one input category to a single value at the plot level and construct
used quantities of inputs in each plot. In this estimation, family labor and hired labor are summed
up into a single variable, “total days of labor”, differently from Table 9. Finally, harvested maize
and used quantities of agricultural inputs are standardized as the amount per acre. Consequently, in
equation (6.1), I denote by yijt the kilograms of harvested maize per acre and by xijt the used amount
of agricultural inputs per acre at plot j.
To estimate equation (6.1), I adopt a linear form in f(xijt;β), that is,
(6.4) log yijt =
∑
k
βk log(x
I
k,ijt) +
∑
l
γlx
C
l,ijt,
where xIk,ijt is the used quantity of agricultural input k per acre in plot j and x
C
l,ijt represents plot
characteristics, as is shown in Column (1) of Table 12. The functional from of equation (6.4) assumes
Cobb-Douglas production function. To allow complementary relations among inputs, I also adopt
translog production function as a more flexible functional form for the robustness check (Bravo-Ureta
et al. 2007). In the translog function, I add logarithms of interaction and squared terms of production
factors to equation (6.4).
In the mean of technical inefficiency in equation (6.2), zijt includes two voucher dummies for
fertilizer and seed and household characteristics. They are listed in Column (2) of Table 12. Despite
the potential endogeneity of voucher dummies, I regard two voucher dummies as exogenous variables in
zijt because finding an appropriate instrumental variable is difficult. In the variances of the technical
inefficiency and the idiosyncratic error, I only include in zu,ijt and zv,ijt a regional dummy for 12
agriculturally high potential regions where the NAIVS program was conducted in the initial stage.
Including voucher dummies or other household characteristics in zu,ijt and zv,ijt is impossible because
of computational problems.
Table 12 presents the estimated result under equations (6.1)-(6.4). The standard errors are ob-
tained by clustering at plot level. Column (1) reports the result of equation (6.1). I find all agricultural
inputs have significantly positive effects on harvested maize per acre, except organic fertilizer and pes-
ticide/herbicide. Column (2) shows the result of the mean technical inefficiency estimated on voucher
dummies and household characteristics in equation (6.2). Be careful that negative coefficients indicate
negative impacts on technical inefficiency, which means corresponding variables improve farmers’ pro-
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duction efficiency. Columns (3) and (4) shows the results on the variances of the technical inefficiency
and the idiosyncratic error in equations (6.2) and (6.3). In Column (2), I find no evidence receiving a
voucher significantly promotes maize production inefficiency. Similarly, in the translog functional form,
I find no significance for two voucher dummies in Table 18 of Supplementary Appendix.
This finding justifies current subsidy programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Even if a subsidy program
for fertilizer and seed considerably changes the distribution ratio of agricultural inputs in production, it
does not deteriorate the productivity. One possible reason for this is farmers’ investment in subsidized
inputs is still insufficient. The subsidized amounts in the NAIVS program, 50 kg of inorganic fertilizer
and 10 kg of improved maize seed, are suitable for planting one acre of land (World Bank 2014). This
is not enough to cover the whole maize land cultivated by farmers, because the average cultivated acres
for maize outnumber one acre in Table 5. In fact, roughly 75 percent of farmers in the household-level
dataset cultivate more than one acre for maize in both waves (633 in 2010/11 and 626 in 2012/12 out
of 845 households).40 Hence, it is possible the increase in subsidized inputs relative to non-subsidized
inputs is insufficient to drive diminishing returns of subsidized inputs.41
Finally, I evaluate yield gains from subsidized inputs. In Column (1), raising nitrogen use and
quantity of improved maize seed per acre by one percent increases harvested quantity of maize by
0.146 and 0.206 percent, respectively.42 Using these coefficients, this thesis calculates how much profits
fertilizer beneficiaries gain by using additional one percent of nitrogen per acre. World Bank (2014)
reported the top-up payment for 50 kg of urea in the southern highlands in 2012/13 is 35,000 shillings.
By dividing 35,000 by 50 × 0.46, I obtain the price of nitrogen per kilogram, 1,522 shillings. Using
WFP VAM data, I get the price of maize per kilogram after the harvest in the southern highlands in
Wave 3 (580.62 shillings). As the initial level of harvested maize and nitrogen per acre, I adopt the
median in the southern regions in Wave 3 (424.24 kg for harvested maize and 9.41 kg for nitrogen).
The revenue is calculated by multiplying maize price by the increased maize quantity. The cost is
calculated by multiplying additional nitrogen by its price. By subtracting the cost from the revenue,
I finally obtain the profit, roughly 216 shillings. If the exchange rate of one US dollar for Tanzanian
shillings is assumed to be one for 1,550 in 2012, farmers gain profits of only 0.14 US dollars by additional
one percent of nitrogen per acre. Consider a case where farmers increase nitrogen by 67 percent, the
40In the plot-level dataset, the average amount of nitrogen per acre for beneficiaries is around 10 kg. This value is
even lower than 23 kg, the amount of nitrogen contained in 50 kg of urea.
41The NAIVS program selects beneficiaries on the individual basis, not on the household basis. Thus, it is possible
that more than one members receive a voucher within one household. Because of data limitation, we cannot clarify how
many members receive a voucher in each household.
42Recall that harvested quantity of maize and all production factors in Column (1) are in the logarithmic form.
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Table 12: SF Estimates of Production Frontier and Technical Inefficiency
(1) Production Frontier (2) Mean Technical Inefficiency
log yijt = log{f(xijt;β)}+ vijt − uijt µijt = δ0 + z′ijtδ
Nitrogen (kg/acre) (log) 0.146∗∗∗
(0.000)
Received fertilizer voucher
(dummy)
-0.301
(0.226)
Organic fertilizer (kg/acre) (log) 0.012
(0.301)
Received seed voucher (dummy) -0.058
(0.869)
Improved maize (kg/acre) (log) 0.206∗∗∗
(0.000)
Adult equivalents 0.062∗∗
(0.013)
Pesticide/Herbicide (kg/acre) (log) 0.039
(0.585)
Male-headed (dummy) -0.084
(0.561)
Total days of labor (day/acre) (log) 0.306∗∗∗
(0.000)
Age of household head 0.024∗∗∗
(0.000)
Values of farm implements owned
or borrowed (shilling/acre) (log)
0.079∗∗∗
(0.000)
Education years of household head 0.037
(0.105)
Irrigation (dummy) 0.179
(0.260)
Distance from household to nearest
agricultural market (km) (log)
0.073
(0.299)
Subjective evaluation of soil quality 0.102∗∗∗
(0.000)
Resides in urban areas (dummy) 0.007
(0.970)
Intercropped (dummy) -0.212∗∗∗
(0.000)
Belongs to SACCO (dummy) -0.781∗∗
(0.029)
Cultivated Plot is Owned (dummy) 0.184∗∗
(0.016)
Belongs to Cooperative (dummy) 0.085
(0.534)
Erosion (dummy) -0.030
(0.628)
Avg. maize price over six months
before cultivation (log)
0.878∗∗
(0.046)
Distance from plot to home (km)
(log)
0.072∗∗∗
(0.009)
Resides in initial NAIVS regions
(dummy)
-0.320
(0.286)
Distance from plot to road (km)
(log)
-0.107∗∗∗
(0.000)
Constant -6.689∗∗
(0.035)
Rainfall in cultivation season (mm)
(log)
-0.078
(0.191)
(3) Variance of Technical Inefficiency
Experienced drought/flood in culti-
vation season (dummy)
0.027
(0.914)
σ2ijt = exp(ωu0 + z
′
u,ijtωu)
Experienced crop disease in cultiva-
tion Season (dummy)
0.117
(0.326)
Resides in initial NAIVS regions
(dummy)
-0.085
(0.814)
In Wave 3 (dummy) -0.055
(0.164)
Constant 0.055
(0.874)
Constant 4.548∗∗∗
(0.000)
(4) Variance of Idiosyncratic Error
σ2v,ijt = exp(ωv0 + z
′
v,ijtωv)
Resides in initial NAIVS regions
(dummy)
-0.108
(0.586)
Constant -0.949∗∗∗
(0.000)
Note: Sample size: N = 1, 806. Significant levels: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01 with p-values in
parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at plot level.
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increased quantity of nitrogen by beneficiaries in Table 9. Then, the profit becomes 9,661 shillings,
which is well below 35,000, the subsidized price of 50 kg of urea.43
This indicates farmers have difficulty in earning profits even if they are subsidized. The small profit
results from the low response of the output to subsidized inputs. The output may be insufficiently
increased because of the lack of complementary use of inputs, as shown in Section 3. The low response
may also be attributed to the lack of farmers’ knowledge and experience to use inorganic fertilizer
and improved seed. Ragasa and Mazunda (2018) showed farmers’ satisfaction with extension services
led to greater productivity in the Malawi’s FISP. Hence, undeveloped skills of agricultural modern
technology may have prevented farmers from obtaining the food surplus to sell. In any case, this
result questions the effectiveness of the NAIVS program. Even though the NAIVS promoted farmers
to purchase subsidized inputs, it did not lead to high profits for farmers.44 The low profits discourage
farmers from continuing to adopt modern agricultural technology.
43Be careful I do not multiply 216 shillings by 67. Because (1.01)52 = 1.678, I calculate (1.0014)52 and regard it as
the increased percentage of harvested maize when farmers increase nitrogen by 67 percent.
44Using a fixed-effects linear model, I also regress harvested maize per acre on two voucher dummies and independent
variables of Columns (1) and (2) in Table 12. I exclude production factors from independent variables because the
subsidy seems to affect output through used quantities of inputs. I find no significant impacts of two voucher dummies
on harvested maize. Hence, the low response of the output to agricultural inputs does not result from specific estimation
methods.
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7 Conclusion
Using two waves of the Tanzanian National Panel Survey, I have seen whether the Tanzanian subsidy
program for inorganic fertilizer and improved seed, so-called NAIVS, promoted farmers’ participa-
tion in both agricultural input and grain markets. To evaluate the participation in agricultural input
markets, I have tested whether the NAIVS program affected farmers’ expenditures in all types of
agricultural inputs such as inorganic fertilizer, improved seed, organic fertilizer, traditional seed, pesti-
cide/herbicide, labor, capital. To evaluate the participation in grain markets, on the other hand, I have
examined whether the subsidy raised the probability for farmers to sell maize and their maize sales.
For the estimations above, I controlled for time-constant heterogeneity of farmers by the Correlated
Random Effects Tobit and Probit models. The models were estimated at household level to grasp
farmers’ behaviors in agricultural markets. Finally, I have investigated whether a new composition of
agricultural inputs in production, which was realized after the program was introduced, deteriorated
the efficiency in agricultural production. To estimate the subsidy impact on the efficiency, I relied on a
Stochastic Frontier model. The model was estimated at plot level to estimate agricultural productivity
accurately.
Consequently, the average subsidized household at least tripled the expenditure in subsidized inputs
(inorganic fertilizer and improved seed). This increase was mainly realized by the increased purchases
of fertilizer and seed by beneficiaries of each type. The considerable increase did not accompany
significant changes in the expenditure on non-subsidized inputs, which suggests the program did not
sacrifice nor promote the expenditure on non-subsidized inputs. Conversely, used quantities of labor and
capital in production, differently from those expenditures in markets, significantly increased by voucher
receipts. This suggests farmers address increased demands for inputs by the subsidy without conducting
market transactions, if the inputs can be supplied by farmers themselves. Hence, the subsidy lacks the
power to commercialize farmers’ activities in production beyond subsidized inputs. One concern is
subsidized farmers overused cheap inorganic fertilizer and improved seed beyond efficient application
levels. However, the new allocation of production factors realized by the subsidy did not deteriorate
the efficiency of farmers’ maize production.
On the other hand, the NAIVS program did not increase the probability to sell maize nor maize
sales. Hence, the participation of subsidized farmers in grain markets was not activated. One possible
reason for this is the NAIVS program subsidized farmers who had already sold grains. This reasoning is
supported by the significance of time-averaged values of the fertilizer voucher dummy, which suggests
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heterogeneity between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Another reason is the production increase
was insufficient to generate the food surplus for farmers to sell. One percent increase of nitrogen and
improved seed per acre led to 0.2 percent increase of maize production at most.
These results provide pessimistic outlooks on an input-subsidy program in Tanzania, or possibly in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Though the NAIVS program increased fertilizer and seed consumptions without
sacrificing efficiency, it did not promote farmers’ selling activities in grain markets. Hence, the NAIVS
program did not lead to sustainable agricultural production for farmers because grain-selling activities
is a main income source for Tanzanian smallholders to invest in new agricultural inputs. In fact, only
37 percent of beneficiaries continued to purchase fertilizer after the program graduation (World Bank
2014). Moreover, most of these beneficiaries had experience to purchase fertilizer before subsidized.
What is worse, the NAIVS program is facing severe budget constraints as external funding from
development partners terminated, which discourages the government from maintaining the program
scale (Cameron et al. 2017).
Therefore, the government should design more sustainable and cost-effective policy in the next
phase. Raising the prevalence and quality of extension services is a candidate policy because the lack
of knowledge to use inputs may prevent higher agricultural production. Candidate policies are not lim-
ited to extension services, however. For example, simplifying import procedures at port seems to reduce
fertilizer retail price because redundant charges in administrative procedures and port congestion raise
domestic fertilizer price (IFDC 2012; Benson et al. 2012). Another candidate is to construct consistent
and transparent policy for grain markets. The Tanzanian government has regularly intervened crop
markets for food security, and stopped crop exports at the border even in 2011 when the NAIVS pro-
gram was being implemented (Benson et al. 2012). The government attempts to promote agricultural
production in the NAIVS program on one hand, and destabilizes crop price by intervention on the
other hand. This inconsistent policy may discourage farmers from investing in new agricultural inputs
and selling harvested crops. Though effective policies to promote smallholders’ purchase of agricultural
inputs have not been clarified statistically, the remedies above are worth considering as a cost-effective
and sustainable policy before subsidy programs.
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Table 15: Initial NAIVS Regions: CRE Probit and Tobit Estimates of Probability to Sell and
Sales in Grain Markets on Voucher Dummies
Maize Crops except Maize
(1) Probit (2) Tobit (3) Probit (4) Tobit
Explanatory Variables Sell Maize Maize Sales Sell Crops Crop Sales
Received fertilizer voucher
(dummy)
-0.085
(0.707)
-0.176
(0.613)
0.196
(0.457)
1.040
(0.392)
Received seed voucher (dummy) 0.408
(0.191)
0.622
(0.177)
0.130
(0.736)
0.200
(0.907)
Adult equivalents -0.064
(0.399)
-0.102
(0.381)
0.192∗∗
(0.025)
0.335
(0.373)
Male-headed household
(dummy)
0.566∗∗∗
(0.001)
1.017∗∗∗
(0.000)
-0.384∗
(0.064)
-0.164
(0.870)
Age of household head -0.004
(0.940)
-0.009
(0.918)
-0.001
(0.985)
-0.074
(0.819)
Education years of household
head
-0.027
(0.657)
-0.036
(0.694)
-0.057
(0.385)
-0.256
(0.420)
Acres of cultivated land 0.000
(0.977)
0.000
(1.000)
-0.014
(0.417)
-0.074
(0.312)
Weighted average of subjective
soil quality
0.119
(0.149)
0.194
(0.137)
-0.149
(0.104)
0.619
(0.157)
Distance to nearest agricultural
market (km) (log)
0.102
(0.938)
1.354
(0.554)
-0.024
(0.985)
3.520
(0.627)
Resides in urban areas (dummy) -0.873
(0.512)
-1.124
(0.584)
-0.198
(0.902)
2.533
(0.707)
Belongs to SACCO (dummy) -0.212
(0.598)
-0.359
(0.585)
-0.161
(0.732)
0.407
(0.853)
Belongs to cooperative
(dummy)
0.556∗∗
(0.020)
0.937∗∗
(0.011)
0.172
(0.511)
1.429
(0.244)
Experienced drought/flood in
cultivation season (dummy)
-1.462∗∗
(0.025)
-2.644∗∗
(0.010)
0.161
(0.794)
-5.497∗
(0.054)
Experienced crop disease in cul-
tivation season (dummy)
0.352
(0.635)
0.694
(0.567)
-0.050
(0.949)
-0.539
(0.889)
Avg. maize price over six months
after harvest (log)
-0.037
(0.976)
0.770
(0.701)
0.005
(0.997)
-3.647
(0.589)
Rainfall in cultivation season
(mm) (log)
-0.078
(0.884)
-0.813
(0.337)
0.106
(0.866)
2.452
(0.408)
In Wave 3 (2012/13) (dummy) 0.012
(0.989)
-0.588
(0.684)
0.011
(0.991)
4.145
(0.396)
Time-average of fertilizer
voucher dummy
0.882∗∗∗
(0.008)
1.492∗∗∗
(0.004)
-0.693∗
(0.096)
0.039
(0.984)
Time-average of seed voucher
dummy
-0.058
(0.909)
-0.127
(0.870)
-1.059
(0.124)
-4.829
(0.111)
σ̂a 0.805 1.366 1.162 5.972
σ̂u 1.913 6.967
Note: Sample size: N = 1, 046. Significant levels: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01 with p-values in
parenthesis. Standard errors are default values in Stata. Columns (1) and (2) concern selling and sales
of maize; Columns (3) and (4) concern those of all crops but maize. Time-averaged values, the
constant and region dummies are omitted from the table. Exceptionally, two time-averaged values of
fertilizer and seed voucher dummies are included.
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Table 17: Proportion of Maize Acre ≥ 0.5: CRE Probit and Tobit Estimates of Probability to
Sell and Sales in Grain Markets on Voucher Dummies
Maize Grains except Maize
(1) Probit (2) Tobit (3) Probit (4) Tobit
Explanatory Variables Sell Maize Maize Sales Sell Grain Grain Sales
Received fertilizer voucher
(dummy)
-0.444
(0.180)
-0.590
(0.221)
0.547
(0.251)
1.080
(0.634)
Received seed voucher (dummy) 0.388
(0.371)
0.526
(0.397)
0.196
(0.742)
0.592
(0.841)
Adult equivalents -0.047
(0.677)
-0.059
(0.743)
0.082
(0.497)
-0.057
(0.936)
Male-headed household
(dummy)
0.157
(0.366)
0.293
(0.301)
0.086
(0.717)
1.692
(0.212)
Age of household head 0.032
(0.671)
0.055
(0.638)
0.004
(0.969)
-0.252
(0.629)
Education years of household
head
-0.082
(0.231)
-0.129
(0.216)
0.011
(0.893)
0.054
(0.906)
Acres of cultivated land 0.012
(0.803)
0.024
(0.745)
-0.058
(0.340)
-0.280
(0.364)
Weighted average of subjective
soil quality
0.159
(0.101)
0.242
(0.110)
-0.238∗∗
(0.041)
0.180
(0.778)
Distance to nearest agricultural
market (km) (log)
0.396
(0.671)
0.544
(0.701)
-0.425
(0.745)
-11.581
(0.135)
Resides in urban ares (dummy) 0.089
(0.937)
0.272
(0.885)
-0.576
(0.881)
-8.336
(0.689)
Belongs to SACCO (dummy) -0.543
(0.362)
-0.915
(0.333)
0.080
(0.912)
-1.660
(0.683)
Belongs to cooperative
(dummy)
0.516∗
(0.077)
0.914∗∗
(0.045)
-0.077
(0.806)
2.560
(0.149)
Experienced drought/flood in
cultivation season (dummy)
-1.721
(0.112)
-2.718∗
(0.096)
-1.947∗
(0.091)
-11.765∗∗
(0.043)
Experienced crop disease in cul-
tivation season (dummy)
0.783
(0.533)
1.639
(0.434)
-0.280
(0.803)
0.313
(0.965)
Avg. maize price over six months
after harvest (log)
0.396
(0.820)
0.524
(0.846)
-2.955
(0.185)
-22.857∗
(0.062)
Rainfall in cultivation season
(mm) (log)
-1.182∗∗
(0.026)
-1.735∗∗
(0.028)
1.125∗
(0.092)
3.432
(0.330)
In Wave 3 (2012/13) (dummy) -0.531
(0.678)
-0.753
(0.703)
2.393
(0.146)
19.262∗∗
(0.032)
Time-average of fertilizer
voucher dummy
1.209∗∗∗
(0.009)
1.806∗∗∗
(0.008)
-1.512∗∗
(0.029)
-2.490
(0.454)
Time-average of seed voucher
dummy
0.296
(0.652)
0.383
(0.688)
-1.245
(0.205)
-5.503
(0.249)
σ̂a 0.685 1.122 1.058 6.302
σ̂u 1.928 8.317
Note: Sample size: N = 736. Significant levels: ∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01 with p-values in
parenthesis. Standard errors are default values in Stata. Columns (1) and (2) concern selling and sales
of maize; Columns (3) and (4) concern those of all crops but maize. In all observations, cultivated acres
for maize occupy more than or equal to half the total acres within household. Time-averaged values,
the constant and region dummies are omitted from the table. Exceptionally, two time-averaged values
of fertilizer and seed voucher dummies are included. A few observations are automatically dropped in
Probit models because of computational problems.
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Table 18: Translog Function: SF Estimates of Production Frontier and Technical Inefficiency
(1) Production Frontier (2) Mean Technical Inefficiency
log yijt = log{f(xijt;β)}+ vijt − uijt µijt = δ0 + z′ijtδ
Nitrogen (kg/acre) (log) 0.256∗∗
(0.046)
Received fertilizer voucher
(dummy)
-0.376
(0.173)
Organic fertilizer (kg/acre) (log) 0.148
(0.117)
Received seed voucher (dummy) -0.168
(0.679)
Improved maize (kg/acre) (log) 0.733∗∗∗
(0.004)
Adult equivalents 0.064∗∗
(0.018)
Pesticide/Herbicide (kg/acre) (log) 0.482
(0.410)
Male-headed (dummy) -0.148
(0.307)
Total days of labor (day/acre) (log) 0.428∗∗
(0.011)
Age of household head 0.023∗∗∗
(0.002)
Values of farm implements owned
or borrowed (shilling/acre) (log)
0.071
(0.323)
Education years of household head 0.040
(0.112)
Irrigation (dummy) 0.172
(0.270)
Distance from household to nearest
agricultural market (km) (log)
0.073
(0.302)
Subjective evaluation of soil quality 0.097∗∗∗
(0.000)
Resides in urban areas (dummy) 0.054
(0.756)
Intercropped (dummy) -0.216∗∗∗
(0.000)
Belongs to SACCO (dummy) -0.753∗
(0.064)
Cultivated Plot is Owned (dummy) 0.200∗∗∗
(0.008)
Belongs to Cooperative (dummy) 0.000
(0.999)
Erosion (dummy) -0.024
(0.694)
Avg. maize price over six months
before cultivation (log)
0.829∗
(0.061)
Distance from plot to home (km)
(log)
0.076∗∗∗
(0.005)
Resides in initial NAIVS regions
(dummy)
-0.216
(0.516)
Distance from plot to road (km)
(log)
-0.104∗∗∗
(0.000)
Constant -6.431∗∗
(0.050)
Rainfall in cultivation season (mm)
(log)
-0.077
(0.187)
(3) Variance of Technical Inefficiency
Experienced drought/flood in culti-
vation season (dummy)
0.029
(0.908)
σ2ijt = exp(ωu0 + z
′
u,ijtωu)
Experienced crop disease in cultiva-
tion Season (dummy)
0.120
(0.309)
Resides in initial NAIVS regions
(dummy)
-0.182
(0.643)
In Wave 3 (dummy) -0.038
(0.340)
Constant 0.050
(0.899)
Constant 4.156∗∗∗
(0.000)
(4) Variance of Idiosyncratic Error
σ2v,ijt = exp(ωv0 + z
′
v,ijtωv)
Resides in initial NAIVS regions
(dummy)
-0.146
(0.446)
Constant -0.898∗∗∗
(0.000)
Note: Sample size: N = 1, 806. Significant levels: ∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01 with p-values in
parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at plot level. Interaction and squared terms of production
factors in translog function are omitted from the table.
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Figure 1: Tanzania Map with Region Borders
Downloaded in World of Maps at http://mapsof.net/
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Figure 2: Distribution of Area Harvested for Primary Crops
Source: CountrySTAT in FAO
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Figure 3: Distribution of Production Quantity for Primary Crops
Source: CountrySTAT in FAO
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Figure 4: Total Harvested Areas for Cereals from 2000 to 2015
Source: FAOSTAT
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